Wednesday, January 16, 2019

The Airco D.H.5 and ground attack in 1917


Bombing and ground attack has been an aspect of military aviation ever since 1911, when Italian Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti dropped four grenades over Libya for the first time. Towards the second half of 1917, ground attack was becoming increasingly common on both sides fighting in the First World War. The slightly awkward looking Airco D.H.5 became one of the first dedicated air support aircraft, even if it was designed to for a different role.
The D.H.5 was designed by Geoffrey de Havilland , and the prototype flew in late 1916. After some modifications, the test pilot found the aircraft to be stable, easy to fly and “handy and quick in the air.” The aircraft was also found to be very sturdy, with the wings being able to withstand very high loads in testing. Oliver Stewart wrote that “This aeroplane could dive. That might be written in the memory of the D.H.5… the sight of a formation of D.H.5s was one of the most impressive things of the air war. They appeared to stand vertically on their noses and fall out of the sky like a flight of bombs.”[1] It did turn out that the merits of the D.H.5 did include great maneuverability at altitudes below 10,000 feet, excellent forward field of view and a remarkably sturdy construction. An example of the sturdiness could be noted on November 16, 1917, when 2nd Lieutenant W.R. Jones of No. 32 Squadron had an anti-aircraft shell pass completely through the fuselage of his D.H.5. Only minor damage was sustained, and Jones could land safely.[2]
By building the stagger-wing D.H.5, de Havilland was hoping to combine the excellent view of the pusher aircraft with the aerodynamic and offensive benefits of a tractor aircraft with a synchronized machine gun. Unfortunately, this also meant that the aircraft had little or no view backwards, obviously a significant disadvantage in a dogfight. Oddly enough, the initial machine gun mounting enabled the Vickers machine gun to be elevated in an upwards arc to 60 degrees, thereby enabling the D.H.5 to attack aircraft from below. The D,H.5 was unpopular throughout its service, and several rumors, mostly unfounded, circulated about the handling qualities of the D.H.5. It was a fact that the aircraft did have a serious drop in performance at altitudes above 10,000 feet, and it lost altitude quickly in air-to-air combat. Being known as “De Havilland’s fifth effort”, it was also said that the design was put into service against the wishes of the designer.
The first production D.H.5s reached No. 24 Squadron on May 1, 1917, and for some time this squadron used both D.H.5s and D.H.2s. Eventually the D.H.5 equipped NO. 68 Squadron RFC/No. 2 Squadron AFC, No. 6 and 7 (Training) Squadrons, AFC, and Nos. 24, 32, 41, 64, and 65 Squadrons RFC. The D.H.5 flew various sorties throughout the summer of 1917, but the Ypres battle that started on July 31 was to be the first concerted use of the D.H.5 as a ground attack aircraft.
During the battles for Ypres, the orders for deployment on August 16, 1917 of the II. and V. brigades RFC called for “machine gun and bombing attacks (by night and day) on German aerodromes” as well as machine gun attacks on troops and transport as well as a series of offensive patrols. The V. brigade had squadrons equipped with D.H.5s, and it was decided to coordinate the squadrons with the infantry advance by allocating two D.H.5s to each division for cooperation with the forward infantry in their attack on the final objective.[3] The pilots “were to patrol at low altitude just short of the barrage and engage enemy defensive positions that held up the British advance.” This obviously precluded concentrated air support efforts, and although it may seem reasonable to parse out close air support to all participating infantry units, in reality this left the D.H.5s to provide limited support while making them even more vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire – a larger air unit would be able to overwhelm anti-air defenses, as proven during WW2. It should be added that inclement weather at low altitude also made it quite hazardous to use larger formations.
Besides the divisional support, two patrols, each consisting of four unspecified single seaters, were to cover the entire front of the 5th Army at low altitude, typically 200 to 600 feet, on the enemy side of the front to engage any counterattack. This undertaking seems extraordinarily hazardous, and a concerted enemy effort with several well-placed machine guns would probably have been quite able to dissuade the four single seaters. Besides engaging counterattacks, the four aircraft were also to prevent German contact patrols as a secondary task, although flying at low altitude might very well have made the aircraft the prey of any German contact patrols.
Enemy airfields were also to be engaged, but in a piecemeal fashion, starting with a machine gun fire from a single aircraft as soon as light permitted for accurate firing. The German airfields were thereafter supposed to be bombed over the course of the day. The notion of massing an attack to disable as many enemy aircraft as possible does not seem to have been an option, but the practicalities of launching a squadron before dawn in inclement weather may very well have prohibited this.  
The D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron had successfully provided ground support to the 3rd Army on August 9, and on August 19, support was more concentrated. The advance of the 3rd Brigade was to be supported by five D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron, nine from No. 24 Squadron, and four F.E.2bs. Immediately prior to the infantry attack, three D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron went “over the top” to attack German front line trenches. They were followed by F.E.2bs of No. 18 Squadron, which attacked German trenches as the infantry advanced. The attack was subsequently deemed successful and well-coordinated, and the attacking aircraft supported by S.E.5as of No. 60 Squadron fired some 9,000 rounds into enemy positions.[4] On August 26 the attacks were supported by twelve D.H.5s of Nos. 24 and 41 Squadrons while strong friendly patrols kept German aircraft away from the D.H.5s. However, the confused nature of the ground fighting made effective ground support from the D.H.5s difficult, although Nieuports of No. 29 Squadron provided interdiction by strafing German support lines and reinforcements that were being sent to the front.[5] The successful ground attack efforts led to a contract for another 100 D.H.5s.
Ground support was also called upon during the Battle of the Minin Ridge road in September of 1917. Fighter Squadrons were ordered to patrol for eight hours, with pairs of fighters being relieved every two hours. Pilots were ordered to fly at under 500 feet and to watch for any signs of developing German counter-attacks. Enemy assembly points were also to be noted, and attacks were to be made against troop concentrations, transports and gun positions as well as any low flying enemy aircraft.[6]
Communication was obviously a problem, since the ground attack aircraft could only be guided by flares, smoke signals, panels, or signs, while the aircraft would be limited to throwing down written messages to the ground troops.
By the fall of 1917, both Germans and Allies had aircraft and units dedicated to ground attack. Casualties were high, and they remained high, especially when engaged in strafing trenches. Occasionally during the fall of that year, long-range patrols or sweeps were conducted by composite formations of Bristol F2B Fighters, Sopwith Pups and D.H.5s. These sweeps were stepped in layers to optimize the performance of each type of aircraft. Sopwith Pups would be flying at 15,000 feet, the Bristol F2Bs at 12,000 feet, while the D.H.5s would be flying at an altitude of 9,000 feet.[7] The success rate of these formations has unfortunately not been able to gauge, but they seem to have been discontinued during the last year of the war as more high-performance types of aircraft came into widespread service.
On the eve of the Battle of Cambrai, November 20, 1917, the RFC had amassed 134 single-seat fighters and 18 two-seater Bristol Fighters against 20 fighters of Jasta 5. On the morning of November 20, all three flights of Nos. 64 and 68 (Australian) Squadron, respectively, were in the air, although rain and fog forced the flights to operate in pairs, and soon enough aircraft were operating individually. The first casualty of No. 68 Squadron was probably Captain John Bell, who was shot through the chest. He crashed and was rescued, but he died of his wounds. Next to follow was Lieutenant Robertson, who’s D.H.5 was shot up so badly by an enemy aircraft that he had to land at the advanced landing ground at Bapaume. Lieutenant Huxley of No. 68 Squadron reported that he had dropped one bomb at a gun carriage, machine gunned the men around it, and killed three horses. He then blocked the road into Cambri by smashing a supply wagon in a similar manner. Flying through the mist he saw a body of 300 men, drawn up in fours as if on parade. “This parade was dismissed quicker than [any] parade ever before.” Lieutenant Les H. Holden landed his D.H.5 at the advanced landing ground with his machine a total wreck, earning the nicknames “Lucky Les” and “Homing Pigeon”. Lieutenant Leslie N. Ward was shot down by ground fire, and he broke his leg in the ensuing forced landing behind German lines, where he was captured. Captain Gordon C. Wilson of ‘B’-flight, No. 68 Squadron described how Lieutenant Harry Taylor was downed: “Then, as I zoomed up after a burst of machine-gun fire and turned to dive again, I missed Taylor… The next second the red light of a pilot-rocket showed up beside me. I guessed it was fired by Taylor, and it meant that he was in distress. Another red light followed rapidly, and then I saw him down on the ground wrecked and among the enemy. His machine was just a heap of wreckage. One wing lay twenty yards away from the rest of the heap, from which Taylor had scrambled…” Under protective fire from Captain Wilson, Taylor took up a German rifle, joining with an advancing British infantry patrol which had lost its officer, and leading it to bring in a wounded man. Taylor and his men made it back to the own lines, but not before trying to fly off in Captain Bell’s D.H.5. It was beyond repair, and Taylor rejoined the squadron at the advanced landing ground. No. 68 Squadron had six D.H.5s shot down on November 20, and one aircraft missing. One pilot was dead from his wounds, one survived his wounds, and one was missing.[8] The squadron was awarded six Military Crosses for its efforts during the Battle of Cambrai.
Four D.H.5s of No. 64 Squadron were sent to Flesquières on November 20, and they began their attacks on gun positions at 7am. “The pilots bombed the gun-pits, with their 25lb bombs, scoring at least one direct hit, and expended their ammunition against the gun-detachments. One group of gunners, who ran for shelter to a house, got jammed in the doorway and, immovable, were riddled by the bullets of the leader of the D.H.5s. One of the pilots had a stoppage in his machine-gun and had flown some distance eastwards before he had rectifies the stoppage. He turned back towards Flesquières, but when he came over the German battery positions again at 7-45 a.m, he could find no activity of guns or personnel. Several corpses of men were lying near the pits, and dead horses and a limber were on the road. It is possible that in the interim the guns had been pulled out and the earlier low-flying attacks had caused or accelerated this precaution.”[9]  
The attacks were a complete success, and the gun positions were evacuated. Other gun positions were strafed by Sopwith Camels from No. 3 and 46 Squadrons. The D.H.5s and Camels continued engaging enemy positions throughout the day, only landing to rearm and refuel their aircraft.   
By dawn on November 22, the battle was proceeding well, although the gains of the previous days were commanded by enemy positions on and around a ridge by the Bourlon Woods. Machine guns and infantry positions held up the advance, and the ridge had to be taken. Starting at 7.10am, aircraft from four squadrons, Nos. 3, 46, 64 and 68 (Australian), attacked targets in the woods with bombs and machine gun fire to soften up the German ground units. This time enemy aircraft reinforced the defenses, but the main source of casualties remained anti-aircraft fire. The actual infantry attack against the village Fontaine-Nôtre Dame and the Bourlon Woods began on November 23, and it was supported by the same four squadrons that had been active the day before. That morning, the D.H.5s of No. 68 (Australian) Squadron found the British attack being held up in a corner of Bourlon Woods. Three British tanks were brought to a halt by a German battery consisting of two guns. Lieutenant F. G. Huxley attacked the gun position with four 25-pound Cooper bombs from an altitude of 100 feet, which temporarily suppressed the battery, allowing the three tanks as well as another three behind to continue their attack. Huxley then proceeded to support an infantry attack on another German strongpoint with machine gun fire, which helped the infantry take the position. An American pilot serving with No. 68 (Australian) Squadron, Lieutenant A. Griggs, dived repeatedly at another position in the area, but he was shot down and killed by ground fire.
After D.H.5s and Camels had supported the attack on Bourlon Woods, it was concluded that “the aeroplane pilots often made advance possible when the attacking troops would otherwise have been pinned to the ground.”
By November 23, Manfred von Richthofen’s Jagdgeschwader 1 had been sent to reinforce the German defenses. Von Richthofen forced a D.H.5 to land before attacking D.H.5 A9299 flown by Lieutenant James Alexander Vazeill Boddy of No. 64 Squadron at 2pm. Boddy described the action on November 23 after the war:
“The first target I selected was a trench packed with Germans and as I dived down I was treated to the thrilling spectacle of our men actually charging in and taking it at the point of the bayonet. Next, I sprayed some reserves coming up from a village in the rear and then turned my attention to the support trenches behind Bourlon Wood which were to fully occupied to miss. Above the gaunt shattered trees of the wood itself the scene was indescribable. Out of the fog of smoke and gas, artillery and contact machines loomed from every direction. From below there was an inferno of bursting shells and at the edge of the woods a row of tanks appeared to be help up by anti-tank gun fire. One was blazing furiously. In the hope of being able to help them I searched the wood for these batteries and did my best to silence them with bombs and machine gun fire. My gun then jammed badly, and I flew around trying to clear it. What happened after that I am unable to say, but it seems that I was shot down and didn’t regain consciousness until I reached a base hospital two or three days later. I do remember seeing some of the red machines of Richthofen’s circus a few thousand feet up, but there were some S.E.s up there too, so I left it at that. Evidently one of them, and from the published list of his victories, I believe it was the Baron himself, got through and on to my tail. A bullet fractured my skull but subconsciously I must have kept control and tried to land – usually the D.H.5 being nose heavy dropped like a brick if you let go of the stick. I crashed between two trees in the north-east corner of the wood, and broke both of my thighs, one being completely crushed by the engine.”[10] 
When the Germans counter-attacked on November 30, they also committed ground attack aircraft, and there were several cases of brief air combat between the ground attack missions. That same day, November 30, the heavy anti-aircraft fire around the village of Bourlon led Lieutenant Arthur Gould Lee of No. 46 Squadron to try out a new tactic. Lee and his wingman were ordered to attack a specific house in the village in his Sopwith Camel using four 25-pound Cooper bombs. The original plan called for four separate attacks dropping one bomb each time, but the anti-aircraft fire dissuaded Lee, who instead opted for a steep dive into the concentration of enemy fire to a release altitude of 200 feet. Unfortunately, the two bombs dropped by Lee and his wingman missed the target, and Lee decided to go back by himself. This time Lee dove down to 100 feet, and he released his remaining three Cooper bombs, making his escape at a harrowing altitude of 20 feet. However, his Camel was only hit by two enemy rounds, one shattering the handle of his throttle control, and one grazing his Verey gun shells.[11] It is not known if the D.H.5 squadrons tried out bombing at a steep angle, although the robustness of the D.H.5 would have allowed it, but the RFC and RAF conducted various experiments with so-called dive-bombing from single-seaters during 1918.
The air activity continued to be intense around Cambrai until the offensive ended on December 7. The Germans committed special squadrons, Schutzstaffeln, for the protection of observation aircraft and for trench attack. There were often more than 50 aircraft over a front of five miles, as described by a pilot: “An absolute melee of aircraft around Bourlon Wood, the air thick with D.H.5s, S.E.5s, R.E.8s and Bristol Fighters.”[12] This was also the last hurrah for the D.H.5. since most units switched to S.E.5s towards the end of 1917.
During the Battle of Cambrai, the casualty rate never dropped below 30 percent, and during the initial phases of the battle, on November 20, a staggering 35 percent of aircraft committed to close air support failed to return. Out of the D.H.5s of No. 64 Squadron, No. 68 (Australian) Squadron and the Sopwith Camels of No. 46 Squadron engaged that day, nine aircraft were lost over enemy territory, while four were wrecked and thirteen were so badly damaged from enemy fire or accidents in the prevailing mist that they had to be sent back to depots for reconstruction. The fighter pilots resented close air support missions, as it was seen as a terrible waste of men and equipment. One aviator claimed that he would “rather than face a single trench-strafing foray, I would much prefer to go through half a dozen dogfights with Albatroses”.[13]
It is worth noting that the combined arms tactics of the Cambrai offensive led to German anti-aircraft guns being used against tanks, and the German High Command had to issue special orders to limit the use of anti-aircraft artillery against tanks.[14] Ground attack aircraft still did retain some air defense tasks, though, and four D.H.5s or Camels awaiting ground support missions were always to be prepared to engage enemy aircraft before being called upon to support the ground troops.
After the war, the RAF did engage in ground attack missions as part of its air policing of the colonies, but ground attack was not to be part of RAF doctrine, mainly due to the high casualty rate. The heavy bomber was to be the main vehicle a new strategic concept for engaging targets on the ground.


Bibliograhy:
 John Bennett. Highest Traditions. The History of No 2 Squadron RAAF. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995
F.M. Cutlack. Official History of the Australia in the War of 1918, Vol. VIII, Australian Flying Corps < https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1417020>
Richard P. Hallion. Strike From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945.  University of Alabama Press, 1989
H. A. Jones. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The War in the Air Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, Vol IV. London: Oxford University Press, 1934
Colin Owers. De Havilland Aircraft of World War I. Volume 2: D.H.5 – D.H.15. Boulder: Flying Machines Press, 2001
Alex Revell. British Fighter Units. Western Front 1917-18. London: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1978
Charles Schaedel. Men &Machines of the Australian Flying Corps, 1914-19. Victoria: Kookaburra Technical Publications,972
Peter C. Smith. Dive Bomber! Aircraft, Technology, and Tactics in World War II. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008
The De Havilland D.H.5. Profile Publications, Number 181. Leatherhead: Profile Publications.


[1] The De Havilland D.H.5. Profile Publications, Number 181. Leatherhead: Profile Publications, p. 5
[2] Owers, p.1
[3] P. 176
[4] Revell, pp. 17-18
[5] Jones, p. 180; Revell, p. 18
[6] Revell, p. 18
[7] Jones, p. 232
[8] Owers, pp. 2-3, Schaeder pp. 37-38
[9] F.M. Cutlack. Official History of the Australia in the War of 1918, Vol. VIII, Australian Flying Corps.
[10] Revell, pp. 22-24.
[11] Smith, p. 11
[12] Revell, p. 25
[13] Strike From the Sky, p 21.
[14] Jones, p. 246