The beginning of Bomber Command's Strategic Air Offensive against Germany

250-lb GP bombs on trolleys are prepared by armourers, prior to loading into Handley Page Hampden Mark I, P1333 'EA-F', of No. 49 Squadron RAF at Scampton, Lincolnshire. P1333 crash-landed near Breda, Netherlands, on returning from a raid on Merseburg, Germany on 17 August 1940. The Hampden parked in the distance, P1347 'EA-D', crashed in Brittany with the loss of all her crew after being hit by anti-aircraft fire over Stettin, Germany, on 4/5 September 1940 (IWM/Air Ministry Second World War Official Collection).

On May 15, 1940, 36 Hampdens, 39 Wellingtons and 24 Whitleys from RAF Bomber Command took off on the very first mission to bomb German factories. The initial results were meagre, but at the end of the war, the British bomber offensive would have caused massive devastation – at a terrible cost.

Planning of an air campaign

The first significant change to the pre-war air bombing policy had been initiated by with a directive issued to C-in-C Bomber Command, Charles Portal, on April 13, 1940. This directive was more of a reaction to the course of the war than an actual bombing strategy, and it would affect the bombing campaign for the next few years. Plan WA 8 was the night attack on Germany, and the priorities were given as:

1.     Identifiable oil plants

2.     Identifiable electricity plants, coking plants and gas ovens

3.     Self-illuminating objectives vulnerable to air attack

4.     If authorized, main German ports in the Baltic

If the Low Countries were attacked, focus would be on “…vital objectives in Germany, starting in the Ruhr, to cause the maximum dislocation to lines of communication of the German advance through the Low Countries”. The importance of ‘identifiable’ targets was stressed at a War Cabinet meeting on May 10, and it was stated that “it is preferable not to begin bombing ops in the Ruhr until we have definite news that the Germans have attacked targets… which would cause casualties to civilians”.  

Rotterdam

Up to the end of the so-called Phoney War of 1939-1940, air activity on both sides had in general been limited to reconnaissance and leaflet dropping. However, there were bomber attacks on German and British soil before the opening of the Bomber Offensive against Germany. During a Luftwaffe attack on Scapa Flow on March 16, 1940, some of the raiders’ bombs fell on the small settlement of Bridge of Waithe on the island of Hoy. One civilian was killed and seven were injured. This prompted a retaliatory raid against a German seaplane base at Hörnum on the southern tip of the island of Sylt. Twenty Hampdens from 5 Group and thirty Whitleys from 4 Group. Only superficial damage was caused, but the raid was lauded in the press and the commander of No. 10 Squadron, Bill ‘Crack Em’ Staton, became a national hero.

On May 10, Germany invaded France and the Low Countries. Bomber Command flew tactical support missions with Fairey Battles and Bristol Blenheims against the advancing German columns, suffering heavy casualties in the process. The heavy bombers of Bomber Command undertook missions against German lines of communication, crossings over the river Meuse, and points of congestion behind enemy lines. The heavy squadrons conducted twenty-seven raids between May 11 and May 15. This was considered ‘collaboration’ in the land battle, and the targets were marshalling yards and communications lines west of the Rhine. It was thought that the Germans would see this as fully legitimate and non-provoking.

On May 13, the Luftwaffe launched a heavy attack on Rotterdam as a result of the tenacious Dutch defense of the city. One hundred Heinkel He 111 bombers took off to bomb Rotterdam, and almost a hundred tons of bombs were dropped on the city, killing close to a thousand civilians and destroying around 20,000 buildings. Rotterdam and the Netherlands capitulated that same day. This was the first air attack on a civilian target in the Western theatre of operations

The War Cabinet was of the opinion that the “gloves were off” regarding the air campaign and that the town of the Ruhr valley now were legitimate targets. On May 15, Prime Minister Chamberlain authorized bombing east of the Rhine for the night of May 15/16. 

Defenses

In June 1938, State Secretary of of Aviation, General Erhard Milch, ordered the creation of an Air Defense Zone (ADZ) West, which was to be a secondary line of Flak guns, searchlights and sound detectors integrated into the West Wall defenses. The idea was not to hinder attackers, but to make enemy formations disperse and seek higher altitudes, thus exposing them to fighter attack. The ADZ was between 20 and 50 kilometers wide, and a bomber would need up towards five minutes to cross the zone. Considering that the RAF envisioned daylight raids at an altitude of 10,000 feet during the 1930s, the ADZ would probably been quite effective. As the war broke out, the total Flak and searchlight forces available included 657 heavy Flak batteries, 560 light Flak batteries, and 188 searchlight batteries. There were also three railroad Flak gun battalions, three barrage balloon battalions and seven naval Flak gun battalions defending especially important parts of the German coast. Finally, the Luftwaffe also had two squadrons (Staffel) of Bf 109 aircraft in a night fighter role, 10./(N)JG 26 at Bonn-Hangelar to cover the Cologne area, and 10./(N)JG 53 at Heilbronn further south, near Stuttgart. The single-seat Bf 109 was however ill-suited to night-fighting at that time. A division (Gruppe), IV./(N) JG 2 of Bf 109s was added during the winter of 1939/40, to defend the Heligoland Bight, but successes were slow in the coming. In April of 1940, Hauptmann Wolfgang Falck, the commander of I./ZG 1 in occupied Denmark, began experimenting with night-fighting with his twin-engine Bf 110 heavy fighters based on an early form of radar intercept. Although Falck would be instrumental in the creation of an effective German night-fighter force, no German night fighters were engaged against the Bomber Command raid of May 15/16, and Hermann Göring did not accelerate the establishment of a night fighter force until the summer of 1940. 

The German defenses were also aided by radar installations, and the German had eight Freya installations on operation along the North Sea coast in addition to observers and sound ranging sites. The Freya radar could detect targets up to 120 kilometers away, but it could not determine the height of a target.

The Raid

At this early stage of the war, the bombing procedures were little changed from the RAF Independent Force of the Great War. Commanders were allowed considerable freedom within the scope of a mission. There was no attempt to fly in formation, and crews detailed for a night raid could take off at a time of their choosing within a period of two to three hours. They would fly to the target and back on their own, and the staggered departures were intentional and intended to prolong the air raid alarms over Germany, thus depriving the German worker of sleep. Briefings were given as much as twenty-four hours in advance, leaving it to the crews to plot the exact route and occasionally even to have a say in the bomb load. Navigations was done by dead reckoning, as direction finding by radio waves over the European continent was yet to be developed. The actual method of attack was often a matter of individual initiative. Aiming and navigation was aided by moonlight, and May 15 saw a waxing gibbous moon.

The bombers were sent against sixteen different targets throughout the Ruhr Valley. Factories in Dortmund, Sterkrade, and Castrop-Rauxel were designated as targets for nine aircraft each, while the remaining thirteen targets had fewer aircraft attacking. The raid was unspectacular in its execution. Eighty-one aircraft reported bombing at their primary targets or at alternative targets over a wide area with little or no effect. The defenses were alerted, but without any noticeable effect on the attackers.

A few bombs were recorded falling on Cologne and Munster. More specifically, a report from Cologne claimed that bombs aimed at the IG-Werk at Dormagen hit a large farm and killed a dairyman, Franz Romeike, who reportedly was on his way to the outhouse when he turned on a light that promptly attracted a stick of bombs. Another five civilians were wounded, but Romeike was the first of some 20,000 people of Cologne to be killed during the war. In Münster, local media reported that six bombs were dropped in the town, causing light damage and wounding two people. Münster was not on the target list, and no bomber crew reported attacking Münster, but the same local media claimed that “this bombing created a sensation and, for days on end, thousands of inquisitive people were attracted to the scene.” 

With the addition of operations conducted against targets in Belgium, 111 sorties were conducted that night. This was the first time Bomber Command exceeded 100 aircraft on night missions. The only loss was Wellington P9229 from No. 115 Squadron that was reportedly blown off course by a heavy wind and subsequently crashed into high ground at Plainville near Rouen in France. Flight Lieutenant A. E. Pringle and his crew of four – Corporal R. F. Fallows, Sergeant T. R. Kirkham, Corporal R. C. J. Pringle and Flying Officer H. P. Evans - were all killed, making these men the first casualties of the RAF strategic bombing Campaign.

The difficulties of bombing during the beginning of the war can be illustrated by an RAF pilot on a mission to bomb a railway target in Düsseldorf. He explained that when the crew reached the target area, German blackout procedures prevented them from identifying the railway station, whereupon they began to conduct a “square search” of the area. After a while, they simply dropped their bombs into the darkness below. This pilot then went on to complain that “such objectives were pointless when so many (crews) found difficulty in even locating the cities in which they were situated.” These comments do reveal certain things besides the difficulties of navigation, namely that the German defenses were not of such magnitude that a bomber could loiter over a major city in search of a target, and that the German blackout worked well.

Aftermath

Next morning, the announcement that a large force from Bomber Command had attacked various oil and communications targets in the Ruhr Valley was overwhelmingly welcomed by the British citizenry. There was finally a bright spot after weeks of bad news, and the war was carried home to the Boche. The communiqué from the Air Ministry was encouraging: “Each crew was given specific military objectives and instructions that bombs were not to be dropped indiscriminately. A few aircraft failed to locate their objectives and did not drop their bombs, but the majority found and bombed their targets with great effect causing widespread damage and many explosions.” In reality, the fifty-three German bombers that actually bombed Rotterdam caused massive damage. The ninety-nine RAF bombers did not. The raid was largely ineffective, and no real damage was recorded at the targets. Of the 78 aircraft given oil installations as their primary target, only 23 claimed to have found them. For various reasons 16 aircraft failed to attack any target at all.

 Bomber Command revisited the Ruhr next day, this time with a mere twelve aircraft on a mission against oil targets. Throughout May approximately 60 bombers per night were dispatched against industrial targets or targets connected to the Battle of France, such as lines of communication or troop concentrations. Charles Portal believed that Bomber Command would be able to do ‘immense damage’ to German oil production, and on June 4 1940 it was estimated that the German oil production would be reduced by approximately half a million tons in two or three months’ time. In reality, it took three and a half years to reduce the German oil production by 150,000 tons. The strategic bombing campaign also cost the lives of more than 350,000 Germans and tens of thousands of civilians in the surrounding countries. Bomber Command lost 55,573 men in that very same Campaign.

Sources: 

Mark Connelly. Reaching for the Stars. A New History of Bomber Command in World War II. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001

Robin Cross. The Bombers. The Illustrated Story of Ofensive Strategy and Tactics in the Twentieth Century. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1987

Ken Delve and Peter Jacobs. The Six-Year Offensive. Bomber Command in World War Two. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992

Jonathan Falkner, RAF Bomber Crewman. West Bay: Shire Publications, 2010

Max Hastings. Bomber Command. Churchills Epic Campaign. The Inside Story of the RAF’s Valiant Attempt to End the War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989 

Peter Hinchliffe. The Other Battle. Luftwaffe Aces versus Bomber Command. Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1997

Robert Jackson. Before the Storm. The Story of Bomber Command 1939-42. London: Cassell, 2001

Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt. The Bomber Command War Diaries. An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945. Hirsham: Midland Publishing, 2011

Denis Richards. The Hardest Victory. RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995

Edward B. Westermann. Flak. German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001

Turret blown away by FlaK over Duisburg.

No. 428 Squadron, also known as the Ghost Squadron due to its nocturnal operations, was a bomber squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force. The motto of the squadron was Usque ad finem ("To the very end"), and it was initially formed on November 7, 1942, at RAF Dalton in Yorkshire as part of No. 4 Group RAF. It was transferred to No. 6 Group RCAF on January 1, 1943, and it remained part of this group until April 25, 1945. The first operational mission was flown to Lorient on the night of January 26, 1943. In June of 1943 the squadron was re-equipped with Handley-Page Halifaxes and redeployed to RAF Middleton St. George. In June 1944 the squadron was re-equipped with Canadian-built Avro Lancaster Mk Xs, and these were used throughout the rest of the Second World War. The unit was disbanded in September 1945, but saw service again between 1954 and 1961 as an all-weather fighter squadron  flying the Avro CF-100 Canuck.
On the evening of 8/9 april, 1943, 302 aircraft (156 Lancasters, 97 Wellingtons, 73 Halifaxes, 56 Stirlings and ten Mosquitoes) took off to bomb the city of Duisburg in the Rhine Valley as the first of two Bomber Command missions targeting the city. The pilot of Vickers Wellington Mark X NA-Y, serial number HE239, was Sergeant Pilot Leonard Franklin Williamson from Regina, the capitol of Saskatchewan. He had enlisted in 1941, and on the night of April 8 and 9, 1943, he was to pilot NA-Y to Duisburg on his seventh mission. His crew consisted of the navigator, Flight Sergeant W. Watkins, the bomb aimer, Flight Serbeant H. Parker, wireless operator Sergeant J. Powley and finally rear gunner Sergeant Lorenzo Bertrand. The aircraft took off from RAF Dalton in Yorkshire without incident, but as the bombers approached Duisburg at 11:15 pm, the aircraft were subjected to heavy Flak fire. NA-Y was hit three minutes later, and the bomber began vibrating alarmingly while the rudder bar was forced upwards and forwards. However, the Wellington was already on its final run to the aiming point, and Williamson pressed on. The bomb load was released two minuted later, at 11:20 pm. Williamson had checked in with his crew members after the initial Flak hit, but there was no reply from the tail gunner, Sergeant Bertrand. The navigator, Sergeant Watkins, went back through the vibrating fuselage and made a horrific discovery: the entire rear turret and all of the fabric covering the fuselage aft of the beam gun position had been blown away. Meanwhile, Williamson noted that the hydraulics had also been hit, which manifest itself by the bomb doors remaining open and the landing gear being abruptly lowered. Further damage had been caused to the elevators and radio equipment on board. Williamson realized that he could not climb, but he was able to maintain his altitude, so a bail out order was cancelled. After what must have been a gruesome flight back to the United Kingdom, the crew landed at a fighter base in West Malling, Kent. The bombing of Duisburg had limited effect, since the town was covered with a thick layer of clouds, which ruined the Pathfinder markings. Therefore the bombing was scattered, with 40 houses destroyed, 72 damaged and 36 people killed. Another 15 towns in the Ruhr valley were also hit with bombs. Nineteen Bomber Command aircraft were lost, or 4.8 percent of the participating aircraft (seven Wellingtons, six Lancasters, three Halifaxes, and three Stirlings).

Williamson was initially recommended for a Distinguished Flying Medal (DFM), but this was changed on April 28 by the AOC of 6 Group, Air Vice Marshal Brookes, to a recommendation for the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM), the other rank's equivalent of the Distiguished Service Order, which is of a higher valor. The recommendation was signed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris on May 2, 1943.

The body of the unfortunate rear gunner, Sergeant Bertrand, was found by the Germans, and it was buried in the Reichswald War Cemetery. The aircraft was repaired, but spent the rest of the war with two Operational Training Units (OTU), OTU No. 20 at Lossiemouth and OTU No. 22 at Wellesbourne Mountford before becoming a ground instructional airframe in March 1946.

Original caption: "Damage to Vickers Wellington Mark X, HE239 'NA-Y', of No. 428 Squadron RCAF based at Dalton, Yorkshire, resulting from a direct hit from anti-aircraft gun fire while approaching to bomb Duisburg, Germany on the night of 8/9 April 1943. Despite the loss of the rear turret and its gunner, as well as other extensive damage, the pilot, Sergeant L F Williamson, continued to bomb the target, following which it was found that the bomb doors could not be closed because of a complete loss of hydraulic power. Williamson nevertheless brought HE239 and the remainder of his crew back for a safe landing at West Malling, Kent, where this photograph was taken."

USAAF Bombers at Night

The 8th Air Force has by and large been synonymous with massive formations of bombers flying from England to attack targets in Germany and Axis-occupied Europe during daytime missions. However, following serious losses of the summer of 1943, there was a point in time when the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) considered joining the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command in flying nighttime missions, something the British had advocated all along. As it turned out, the 8th Air Force did experiment with night bombing, flying missions together with RAF Bomber Command during September and October 1943.

Once USAAF had deployed personnel to England in 1942, the 8th Air Force actually initiated its bomber operations as crew members on board RAF bombers. On June 29, 1942, the first American bomber crew from the 8th Air Force took part in a RAF Bomber Command operation when an RAF Douglas Boston III commanded by Captain Charles C. Kegelman took part in a daytime mission to bomb the marshalling yards at Hazebrouck. The bomber came from RAF 226 Squadron based at Swanton Morley and the force was composed of in all twelve Bostons.

It was to be a dramatic first mission for the 8th Air Force. Flying in over the target at very low altitude, the lead aircraft dropped its bombs and turned back to base. The second bomber was flown by Captain Kegelman, and he was not as lucky, being hit in the right engine by anti-aircraft fire. The propeller was knocked off the engine, and Captain Kegelman momentarily lost control of the aircraft. The right wing tip hit the ground, and then the belly touched down as well, but the Boston bounced back into the air and Captain Kegelman managed to regain sufficient control to fly the aircraft back to Swanton Morley without any casualties in the crew. Captain Kegelman was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for this mission, while his crew was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross.

On Independence Day, July 4, six American-crewed Bostons joined six RAF Bostons to bomb four German airfields in the Netherlands. De Kooy, Haamstede, and Valkenburg were hit, but the anti-aircraft fire over the coast and at the airfield was heavy, and three of the 8th Air Force crews were lost, including the crew commanded by Captain Kegelman.^[1]

Meanwhile, the 8th Air Force had started to assemble and train units equipped with four-engine B-17 and B-24 bombers to conduct precision-bombing during daytime missions. With extensive defensive firepower, the bombers were considered quite able to reach the target without any escorts, as the pre-World War Two doctrines of most air forces dictated. The first missions were mere nuisance raids to the Germans while the 8th Air Force tried out its capabilities. Initial results pointed towards the feasibility of unescorted daylight mission flown over enemy territory, but this would change. The campaign against the U-boat installations in France started in October 1942, but the results were meager and the casualties fairly high as the American bomber crews in many cases were only partly trained and inexperienced in important areas such as formation flying, bombing and aerial gunnery. However, the tactical procedures for bombing were further improved, most notably by General Curtis LeMay, the commander of the 305th Bomb Group, who improved formation flying and introduced a system of the a lead bomber to coordinate the bomb aiming of an entire formation.

The first mission with formation bombing and lead aircraft took part on January 3, 1943, when the 8th Air Force attacked the U-boat base at Saint Nazaire. Unfortunately, the Flak was lethal over the target, and three B-17s were shot down. Bombing tactics were further refined, and by the summer of 1943, the entire 8th Air Force would be using a lead bomber on its missions. Bomb accuracy tripled, although it was still far from the pre-war ideals of precision bombing.

Winston Churchill and the U.S. Joint Chiefs hoped to convince President Franklin D. Roosevelt to have the USAAF join RAF Bomber Command’s efforts after the Casablanca conference in January 1943, and they almost succeeded. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall told the Commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces, General Henry “Hap” Arnold, that the 8th Air Force was to give up daylight precision bombing for nighttime area bombing. General Arnold rejected this idea, sending the commanding officer of the 8th Air Force, General Ira C. Eaker, to convince Churchill that “round-the-clock” bombing would the more effective than nighttime missions only and that the American bombers were specifically designed for daylight missions. Eaker presented Churchill with a memorandum titled “The Case for Day Bombing” on January 20, 1943, and Churchill agreed to Eaker’s policy. However, the RAF was still cultivating plans to include the 8th Air Force in their nighttime bombing offensive.

The 8th Air Force launched a series of operations later called Blitz Week between July 23 and July 30, 1943. Targets were attacked in central Germany, western Germany and Norway, and the operations cost the 8th Air Force 88 B-17s or 8.5 percent of the attacking strength, an unsustainable casualty rate. The damage caused by these missions was also less than impressive. Blitz Week left the aircrews exhausted, but deep penetrations without fighter escort would continue in August, when the 8th Air Force had rebuilt some of its strength.

RAF Bomber Command would also engage in significant operations during the end of July, but with entirely different results. Operation Gomorrah was aimed at Hamburg and conducted as a series of missions with 3,091 sorties beginning July 24, 1943 for 8 days and 7 nights that culminated with a firestorm on July 28 that claimed more than 40,000 lives. The 8th Air Force contributed to the destruction with 252 B-17s on July 25 and 26, but most of the widespread destruction was caused by RAF Bomber Command and its area bombing of huge swaths of urban terrain. The losses for the RAF were miniscule compared to the 8th Air Force’s Blitz Week with 87 RAF bombers lost over the course of Operation Gomorrah, which equals a loss rate of 2.8 percent. By comparison, the 8th Air Force bombers suffered a loss rate of 6.7 percent during the Hamburg missions.^[2]

The low casualty rate of RAF Bomber Command can to a considerable degree be attributed to technical innovations, in this case chaff, that is strips of foil-coated paper cut to half the wavelength of the German radar which confused and misled the German radar operators by generating enormous amounts of false radar contacts. Further assistance was provided by airborne radar called H2S that enabled Bomber Command to locate and bomb a target, albeit with limited accuracy, even when the target was obscured by clouds or smoke. This would also allow bombing missions to be flown during the winter, when cloud cover tended to limit target visibility.

General Curtis LeMay was impressed by the magnitude of destruction in Hamburg after Operation Gomorrah, but also by the high operational pace of RAF Bomber Command during the summer of 1943, which included a mission to the German V-weapon test sites in Peenemünde. In particular, LeMay noted how the incendiary bombing and subsequent firestorm affected military targets, since the USAAF still fundamentally believed in precision bombing against military targets. But as the citizens of Tokyo would find out, LeMay was definitely considering the effects of indiscriminate fire bombing. The use of new technologies, most notably H2S radar, but also pathfinders and chaff was studied by LeMay and his staff.^[3]

On August 17 the 8th Air Force launched its missions to bomb the ball bearing plant in Schweinfurt and the Messerschmitt plant in Regensburg. The mission was another costly failure with 601 men and 60 out of 376 B-17s being lost. The damage done to production was rather easily repaired by the Germans, since the bombs did not cause any significant damage to the machine tools in the assembly halls. The manufacturing process was subsequently dispersed to several locations, making targeting even more difficult.

The cost of Blitz Week and the Schweinfurt and Regensburg missions forced the 8th Air Force to further re-examine its doctrine, tactics and operational procedures. It was becoming painfully obvious that the B-17 bombers required fighter support and that the effects of bombing were not as destructive as envisioned in pre-war planning. On July 22, Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, the overall commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, sent a memo to General Arnold recommending that the 8th Air Force consider night missions. Six B-17 groups, three from each division, namely the 92nd, 94th, 96th, 305th, 306th and 385th Bomb Groups were initially to join RAF Bomber Command Raids. Thirty B-17s from in each group were to be modified with resin lights, exhaust flame dampers, flash suppressors for the guns and blackout curtains in the navigator’s compartment. The crews were to be supplied night adaptation goggles. The B-17s were also to be equipped with Gee and Standard Beam Approach navigation equipment. Only B-17s with long-range fuel tanks were to converted.[4]    

Furthermore, the commander of the VIII Bomber Command, Brigadier-General Frederick L. Anderson suggested that the 8th Air Force’s 305th Bomb Group should fly experimental night missions with RAF Bomber Command until the USAAF bomber groups had recovered from their losses. Brigadier-General Anderson had actually flown as a passenger in a Bomber Command Lancaster of 83 Squadron on a mission to Essen during the night of July 25, and again to Hamburg on the night of July 27, the night of the firestorm. He could observe the destructive power of RAF’s area bombing firsthand from the Lancaster he was flying in. Although LeMay still considered daylight bombing to be the most effective option to hit German targets, he did acknowledge that RAF’s night bombing accuracy had improved with the introduction of radar and pathfinders, and he liked General Anderson’s idea to send some of the best crews of the 305th Bomb Group to fly night missions with the RAF. By doing this he could show the Allied leadership that he could be flexible while still contributing to the bombing effort against Germany. At least parts of the 8th Air Force would be able to conduct operations before long-range fighter support would be available.^[5]

The four squadrons of the 305th Bomb Group were some of the most experienced if not the most experienced units of the 8th Air Force. They had flown missions since November of 1942, and the 305th Bombardment Group had been commanded by Curtis LeMay himself until May 1943. They were based at Station 105, Chelveston, in Northamptonshire.

The 8th Air Force had already considered nighttime operations, but for propaganda purposes, and in this case leaflet distribution. RAF Bomber Command had included leaflet dropping as part of their operations since the outbreak of the war, and on May 21, 1943, the Commanding General of the 8th Air Force, Major General Ira C. Eaker, issued a directive to initiate leaflet dropping operations. Such activities were conducted as part of daytime missions, but since RAF Bomber Command was looking into eliminating the burden of nighttime leaflet dropping, the 8th Air Force was to consider including this task in its repertoire.^[6]

The planning and training for possible night missions started in late July, when B-17s of the 422nd Squadron were refitted for night operations even before receiving orders to do so from 8th Air Force Headquarters. The commander of the 422nd was Major Gerald “Jerry” Price, and as the 422nd started training for night missions, Major Pierce was temporarily attached to an RAF Bomber Command Squadron on August 27 to fly a 674-plane mission to Nuremberg that same night. Thirty-three bombers were lost that night, but Major Price made it back after personally experiencing the procedures used by RAF Bomber Command. It has also been claimed but not confirmed that he flew the Lancaster that took part in the mission.

For the rest of the 422nd Squadron, the night flying training consisted of night navigation training during practice flights over England starting August 2 and lasting through the first two weeks of September. Despite the nighttime training, the squadron continued to support daytime missions as well. This obviously added to the workload for both aircrews and ground personnel, while some of the converted B-17s were lost during the daytime missions. It was also found that the guns required illuminated reflector sights, and resourceful crews of the 422nd Squadron manufactured such sights from spare plexiglas, claiming that they could be used successfully in the dark.

The training was greatly helped Lieutenant Floyd Truesdell, who had previously volunteered for the Royal Canadian Air Force. He flew missions with RAF Bomber Command in 1942 and early 1943 as a navigator. A pilot in the 422nd, he was nevertheless appointed squadron navigator for combat operations. Unfortunately, Truesdell was killed in a mid-air collision with an RAF Bristol Beaufighter on the late evening of August 31. He was popular pilot as well as pivotal in the training for nighttime missions, and he was sorely missed by the squadron.

It should be noted that other 8th Air Force units, for example the 94th Bomb Group, trained night navigation while deployed to the European Theater of Operations. However, this was to enable bombers that took part in long-range missions over Europe to return and land safely even if the mission lasted beyond dusk.^[7] 

On the night of September 8, 1943, the USAAF joined RAF Bomber Command on a night mission for the first time. Five B-17s from the 422nd Bomb Squadron, 305th Bomb Group, flew from Chelveston on a night mission to Boulogne in occupied France together with 257 aircraft from RAF Bomber Command: 119 Wellingtons, 112 Stirlings, 16 Mosquitoes and ten Halifaxes. The B-17s were led by Major Price in a bomber named “We The People”, and the target was the site of a German long-range gun battery. This target was supposed to be marked by Mosquitoes equipped with Oboe, a British blind targeting system based on radio transponder technology. However, the marking was not successful. The American crews found it difficult to differentiate the Target Indicators and there was also some confusion regarding radio signals while the bomb sights were deemed to be unsuitable. The German gun battery was probably not damaged, but on the other hand, no Allied aircraft were lost.^[8]

The next mission took place on the night of September 15, when 369 aircraft from 3, 4, 6 and 8 Groups of RAF Bomber Command took off to bomb the Dunlop rubber factory in Montluçon in central France. The force consisted of 209 Halifaxes, 120 Stirlings, 40 Lancasters and five B-17s from the 422nd Bomb Squadron. The USAAF contribution of 24 officers and 30 enlisted men was once again led by Major Price, this time flying B-17 41-24615 “Target for Tonite.” Takeoff took place between 8:10 and 8:25 PM, and the flight to the target was without incident. The night was moonlit, although there were some clouds over the target. The German defenses opened fire as the bombers approached Montluçon, but only four bursts of anti-aircraft fire were noted, and they were all behind the B-17s. The Master Bomber for this mission, Wing Commander D. F. E. Deane, dropped his green, red and yellow target indicators accurately over the target between 11:37 and 11:51 PM, and the B-17s dropped 22 1,000-pound General Purpose (GP) bombs over the Dunlop factory, although four of the B-17s required two bomb runs to hit the target while the fifth B-17 needed what must have been a nerve-wracking third run to the target. Every building in the factory was hit and a large fire could be seen up to 80 miles away from the target. All five B-17s returned individually and landed safely within a ten-minute period, a credit to their navigational training. It should be noted that this was the last time the Bomber Command Pathfinders used a Master Bomber until the spring of 1944. The mission resulted in the loss of two Halifaxes and one Stirling.

The 422nd Squadron flew their next mission with Bomber Command the following evening, September 16. The target of the evening was the railway yard at Modane, which was located on the main railway line between France and Italy, just about five miles from the French-Italian border. The mission was flown by 340 RAF Bomber Command aircraft from 3, 4, 6, and 8 Groups, and five B-17s loaded with 35 500 pound GP bombs were part of the force together with 170 Halifaxes, 127 Stirlings and 43 Lancasters. “Target for Tonite” was once again the lead aircraft, although the pilot was Captain Walker of the 422nd Bomb Group. The railway yard was unfortunately located in a steep valley, and the target could not be marked accurately, so the bombers did not hit the target from their altitude of 25,000 feet, although the initial damage assessment claimed that the results were excellent. This mission was the deepest penetration of enemy airspace so far by the 8th Air Force, and the five B-17s spent six and a half hours over occupied Europe. Two Halifaxes and one Stirling were lost during the mission.

SSgt Edward Yozgadlian with two bags in hand is shown on return from a night mission to Montlucon on September 15, 1943.

The night of September 22 saw five B-17s flying as part of a mission composed of 711 aircraft with destination Hanover, and the 422nd Squadron was contributing 60 500 pound GP bombs to the planned destruction. This was the first major raid on Hanover for two years, and this was the first of four major raids planned on the city. However, the city had been on the target list for some time, since it was home to both locomotive and tank works as synthetic rubber plants, oil refineries and textile mills. Despite the numbers of bombers, the hoped-for destruction did not manifest itself. Although the visibility was good, the winds were stronger than forecast, and the target markers were concentrated between two and five miles south-southeast of the city. The aiming errors were further compounded by aiming at the wrong target indicator flares, and the vast majority of the bombs landed in suburban or open areas up to nine miles from the center of the city. The B-17s of the 422nd Squadron flew at the high altitude of 27,000 feet, above and ahead of many of the RAF bombers, and they dropped their bombs at the target indicators furnished by the RAF. The participating crews reported having a grandstand view of the blazing target, without knowing that the fires really weren’t in the target. The 422nd Squadron did not suffer any casualties.

Air Marshal Arthur “Bomber” Harris was however not pleased that the American commanders looking over the post-raid reports wouldn’t find much in the way of results for an effort by 711 aircraft, especially since he wanted the USAAF to join RAF Bomber Command for the Battle of Berlin that Harris planned for the fall and winter of 1943.^[9]

Next evening, September 23, the 422 Squadron was scheduled to take part in a mission to destroy the northern parts of Mannheim and more specifically the marshalling yards in the city together with 623 RAF aircraft. Each B-17 carried 28 500-pound GP bombs, and although one B-17 had to abort before reaching the target, the remaining four B-17s did not suffer any casualties. The RAF lost 32 aircraft, though, which represents a loss rate of 5.1 percent. The target marking on this mission was accurate, and Mannheim suffered significant damage with almost 1,000 buildings destroyed and 102 people killed.

The 422nd Squadron did not conduct night operations for another three days, but on September 27 the target was Hannover to deliver 40 500-pound GP bombs carried by five B-17s. RAF Bomber Command would be attacking Hannover with 678 aircraft as well. Once again, the prevailing winds foiled the Pathfinders, and the target indicators were dropped five miles north of Hannover, thereby sparing the center of the city. The bombs were mainly dropped in the open countryside or villages, causing little or no damage. The bombing force lost 38 aircraft, including a B-17. This was B-17F 42-29555 “Centaur” piloted by Lieutenant Harvey E. Rogers. At 11:15 PM at an altitude of just above 18,000 feet, “Centaur” was spotted by Hauptmann Rességuier flying a Messerschmitt Bf 109G. Cannon shells and machine gun fire tore into the B-17, and only four men made it out of the stricken bomber while seven perished, including an RAF observer, Flying Officer Louis Bower of 196 Squadron, RAF. The B-17 eventually crashed in the area of Landringhausen south-west of Hannover.

Alexander, Graf Rességuier de Miremont, was the first German night fighter pilot to shoot down an American bomber during night operations. He was part of the Stab I/Jagdgeschwader 300 “Wilde Sau” based at the Bonn-Hangelar airfield. The “Wilde Sau” as well as Jagdgeschwader 300, 301 and 302 came into fruition after an initiative by Oberst Hans-Joachim “HaJo” Herrmann, a former bomber pilot. Single-seat fighters were to climb above RAF bombers and thus find the bombers silhouetted against clouds illuminated by searchlights or the burning targets on the ground. Rességuier would eventually be credited with five victories, before he was shot down and wounded by return fire from a Lancaster or possibly fire from an RAF night fighter over Roermond on February 3, 1945 while flying a Heinkel He 219A-2.

 

Alexander, Graf Rességuier de Miremont

Following the missions in September, it may have been that the 8th Air Force was re-considering its experiments with nighttime bombing, but the demand for leaflet drops remained. On September 29, 1943, General Ira Eaker sent a message to the 1st Air Division directing that six aircraft of the 422nd Squadron were to be prepared “to carry out extensive leaflet operations at night over Germany and occupied territories as soon after 1 October 1943, as practicable.”^[10] However, the 422nd Squadron was still to fly two more bombing missions before being fully engaged in leaflet drops.

The next target was the BMW factory in Munich on the night of October 2, and four B-17s loaded with 20 500-pound GP bombs as well as 294 Lancasters were scheduled to take part in this mission. Takeoff was scheduled for 7:55 PM, and one of the aircraft had to abort after suffering a tire explosion during takeoff. The pilot managed to keep the bomber under control stop just short of the end of the runway with only minor damage to the aircraft. Another one of the B-17s was piloted by Major Price, and the navigator was Captain Ralph H. Nutter, a lead navigator of the 305th Bomb Group. Their bomber was caught by searchlights as they passed the Belgian coastline, and anti-aircraft guns opened fire at the B-17. Soon after a German night fighter was spotted by the tail gunner of the brightly illuminated bomber, and although the anti-aircraft guns ceased firing, the night fighter took over. Major Price conducted a “corkscrew”, to the left, sending the bomber in a series of stomach-churning tight turns, dives and climbs to shake off the night fighter as well as the search lights while tracer fire zipped around the B-17. The violent maneuvering proved successful, and as the bomber leveled out in the dark the roll call revealed that no one had been injured and that there was no indication of serious damage to the aircraft, although several instruments had been shattered, and eventually an engine ceased working. Nevertheless, the bomber and its crew made it to Munich and dropped their bomb load at 10:58 PM from an altitude of 20,000 feet. The damaged bomber did make it back to England, although an additional engine broke down during the flight back and with the fuel tanks almost empty.^[11] The bombing destroyed 339 buildings and 191 people were killed, although most bombers missed the BMW factory. Eight Lancasters were lost during the mission.

The eighth and final bombing mission for the 422nd Squadron was scheduled for the night of October 4, and the target for in all 406 bombers was Frankfurt am Main, which was to suffer the first major raid against the city during the war. The three participating B-17s were loaded with four 500-pound GP bombs each in addition to four leaflet cases, the so-called Monroe bombs. The three B-17s were piloted by Captain Peyton Sparks, Lieutenant Tom Seay and Lieutenant Craig Hitchcock, and they would all face misfortune during the mission. The briefed takeoff time was 650PM, but Lieutenant Seay’s aircraft developed engine problems at startup, and their takeoff was delayed by some 30 minutes as mechanics corrected the engine fault. Captain Sparks also had difficulties keeping up with bomber stream on its way to Frankfurt, and they could not find the intended target and had to opt for a target of opportunity. Lieutenant Hitchcock’s aircraft did make it to Frankfurt, but it was caught in the cones of German searchlight at the initial point (IP) just short of the target, and had to perform evasive maneuvers. Neither Sparks nor Hitchcock reported seeing any German night fighters, but a German pilot did spot Lieutenant Seay’s B-17F 42-3061. The bomber was promptly shot down by a Focke-Wulf FW-190A near Frankfurt at 10:25 PM, and five members of the crew were killed while another five became prisoners-of-war. The pilot of the fighter was Leutnant Gerhard Bärsdorf of the Stab II/JG300. Leutnant Bärsdorf did however not receive confirmation for this kill by the Luftwaffe, but he went on to shoot down seven Allied bombers with a further five bombers claimed but unconfirmed. He was killed in a mid-air collision during combat on July 28, 1944.

Leutnant Gerhard Bärsdorf

 

This was the end of nighttime bombing missions for the 422nd Squadron after in all 35 sorties. The next mission took place on October 24, 1943, but this time the bombers were loaded with leaflets only and the target were in occupied France. The 8th Air Force had tried nighttime bombing, but they remained convinced of the feasibility of daylight precision bombing, preferably as part of a round-the-clock bombing strategy with the 8th Air Force hitting targets by day and RAF Bomber Command hitting targets by night.

The 422nd continued to operate as a night leaflet squadron, using its night-flying skills to drop leaflets over occupied Europe and Germany until June 26, 1944, when the unit was re-designated the 858th Night Leaflet Squadron and relocated to Cheddington. The B-17 bomber would continue to be used during nighttime bombing missions by RAF Bomber Command, albeit as an airborne Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) platform to jam German radar. The B-17 was arguably not suited for the British doctrine of strategic bombing operations, since it could not carry as heavy bomb loads as the Avro Lancaster and the Handley-Page Halifax. The career of the B-17 would instead be intimately associated with the USAAF daylight missions.

The early autumn saw 8th Air Force missions to targets in France and the Low Countries while introducing new tactics such as the use of pathfinders and electronic jamming equipment. Additional fighter units were deployed to England, and the B-17G entered service. September 27, 1943 saw P-47 fighters escorting bombers all the way to a target in Germany and back. The B-17s and B-24s of the 8th Air Force would suffer more at the hands of the Luftwaffe, but the tide turned with the increased range of escorting fighters, and nighttime bombing was not considered again by the 8th Air Force, although some B-24s cooperated with RAF Bomber Command as part of diversion forces towards the end of the war.

Bibliography

Martin. W. Bowman. Castles in the Air. Washington, D.C: Brassey’s, 2000.

Roger A. Freeman. The Mighty Eighth War Manual. London: Cassell & Co., 2001

Brian S. Gunderson. Leaflet Dropping Operations in World War II. Air Power History, Spring 1998 – Volume 45, Number 1.

Marin Middlebrook. The Battle of Hamburg. Allied Bomber Forces against a German City in 1943. London: Cassell, 1980.

Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt. The Bomber Command War Diaries. Hersham: Midland Publishing,

Ralph H. Nutter. With the Possum and the Eagle. The Memoir of a Navigator's War over Germany and Japan. Novato: Presidio Press, 2002.

Kevin Wilson. Bomber Boys. The Ruhr, the Dambusters and bloody Berlin. London: Cassell, 2006.

305th Bombardment Group Facebook page.

http://falekeeins.blogspot.com

http://forum.armyairforces.com

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^[1] Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt. The Bomber Command War Diaries. Hersham: Midland Publishing, pp. 282-283.

^[2] Martin Middlebrook. The Battle of Hamburg. Allied Bomber Forces against a German City in 1943. London: Casell, 1980, pp. 323, 326-327.

^[3] Ralph H. Nutter. With the Possum and the Eagle. The Memoir of a Navigator's War over Germany and Japan. Novato: Presidio Press, 2002, pp. 98-99, 121.

[4] Roger A. Freeman. The Mighty Eighth War Manual. London: Cassell & Co., 2001, p. 93.

^[5] Nutter, pp. 120-121.

^[6] Brian S. Gunderson. Leaflet Dropping Operations in World War II. Air Power History, Spring 1998 – Volume 45, Number 1, p. 30.

^[7] Martin. W. Bowman. Castles in the Air. Washington, D.C: Brassey’s, 2000, p. 74.

^[8] Freeman, p. 94, Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, p. 430.

^[9] Wilson, pp. 365-368.

^[10] Gunderson, p. 31.

^[11] Nutter, pp. 130-133.