Bombing and ground
attack has been an aspect of military aviation ever since 1911, when Italian
Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti dropped four grenades over Libya for the first time.
Towards the second half of 1917, ground attack was becoming increasingly common
on both sides fighting in the First World War. The slightly awkward looking Airco
D.H.5 became one of the first dedicated air support aircraft, even if it was
designed to for a different role.
The D.H.5 was
designed by Geoffrey de Havilland , and the prototype flew in late 1916. After
some modifications, the test pilot found the aircraft to be stable, easy to fly
and “handy and quick in the air.” The aircraft was also found to be very
sturdy, with the wings being able to withstand very high loads in testing.
Oliver Stewart wrote that “This aeroplane could dive. That might be written in
the memory of the D.H.5… the sight of a formation of D.H.5s was one of the most
impressive things of the air war. They appeared to stand vertically on their
noses and fall out of the sky like a flight of bombs.”[1] It
did turn out that the merits of the D.H.5 did include great maneuverability at
altitudes below 10,000 feet, excellent forward field of view and a remarkably
sturdy construction. An example of the sturdiness could be noted on November
16, 1917, when 2nd Lieutenant W.R. Jones of No. 32 Squadron had an anti-aircraft
shell pass completely through the fuselage of his D.H.5. Only minor damage was sustained,
and Jones could land safely.[2]
By building the
stagger-wing D.H.5, de Havilland was hoping to combine the excellent view of
the pusher aircraft with the aerodynamic and offensive benefits of a tractor
aircraft with a synchronized machine gun. Unfortunately, this also meant that
the aircraft had little or no view backwards, obviously a significant
disadvantage in a dogfight. Oddly enough, the initial machine gun mounting
enabled the Vickers machine gun to be elevated in an upwards arc to 60 degrees,
thereby enabling the D.H.5 to attack aircraft from below. The D,H.5 was
unpopular throughout its service, and several rumors, mostly unfounded,
circulated about the handling qualities of the D.H.5. It was a fact that the
aircraft did have a serious drop in performance at altitudes above 10,000 feet,
and it lost altitude quickly in air-to-air combat. Being known as “De Havilland’s
fifth effort”, it was also said that the design was put into service against
the wishes of the designer.
The first
production D.H.5s reached No. 24 Squadron on May 1, 1917, and for some time
this squadron used both D.H.5s and D.H.2s. Eventually the D.H.5 equipped NO. 68
Squadron RFC/No. 2 Squadron AFC, No. 6 and 7 (Training) Squadrons, AFC, and Nos.
24, 32, 41, 64, and 65 Squadrons RFC. The D.H.5 flew various sorties throughout
the summer of 1917, but the Ypres battle that started on July 31 was to be the
first concerted use of the D.H.5 as a ground attack aircraft.
During the battles
for Ypres, the orders for deployment on August 16, 1917 of the II. and V.
brigades RFC called for “machine gun and bombing attacks (by night and day) on
German aerodromes” as well as machine gun attacks on troops and transport as
well as a series of offensive patrols. The V. brigade had squadrons equipped with
D.H.5s, and it was decided to coordinate the squadrons with the infantry
advance by allocating two D.H.5s to each division for cooperation with the
forward infantry in their attack on the final objective.[3]
The pilots “were to patrol at low altitude just short of the barrage and engage
enemy defensive positions that held up the British advance.” This obviously
precluded concentrated air support efforts, and although it may seem reasonable
to parse out close air support to all participating infantry units, in reality
this left the D.H.5s to provide limited support while making them even more
vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire – a larger air unit would be able to overwhelm
anti-air defenses, as proven during WW2. It should be added that inclement
weather at low altitude also made it quite hazardous to use larger formations.
Besides the
divisional support, two patrols, each consisting of four unspecified single
seaters, were to cover the entire front of the 5th Army at low altitude,
typically 200 to 600 feet, on the enemy side of the front to engage any
counterattack. This undertaking seems extraordinarily hazardous, and a
concerted enemy effort with several well-placed machine guns would probably
have been quite able to dissuade the four single seaters. Besides engaging
counterattacks, the four aircraft were also to prevent German contact patrols
as a secondary task, although flying at low altitude might very well have made
the aircraft the prey of any German contact patrols.
Enemy airfields
were also to be engaged, but in a piecemeal fashion, starting with a machine
gun fire from a single aircraft as soon as light permitted for accurate firing.
The German airfields were thereafter supposed to be bombed over the course of
the day. The notion of massing an attack to disable as many enemy aircraft as
possible does not seem to have been an option, but the practicalities of
launching a squadron before dawn in inclement weather may very well have
prohibited this.
The D.H.5s of No.
41 Squadron had successfully provided ground support to the 3rd Army on August
9, and on August 19, support was more concentrated. The advance of the 3rd
Brigade was to be supported by five D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron, nine from No. 24
Squadron, and four F.E.2bs. Immediately prior to the infantry attack, three
D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron went “over the top” to attack German front line
trenches. They were followed by F.E.2bs of No. 18 Squadron, which attacked
German trenches as the infantry advanced. The attack was subsequently deemed successful
and well-coordinated, and the attacking aircraft supported by S.E.5as of No. 60
Squadron fired some 9,000 rounds into enemy positions.[4] On
August 26 the attacks were supported by twelve D.H.5s of Nos. 24 and 41
Squadrons while strong friendly patrols kept German aircraft away from the
D.H.5s. However, the confused nature of the ground fighting made effective
ground support from the D.H.5s difficult, although Nieuports of No. 29 Squadron
provided interdiction by strafing German support lines and reinforcements that
were being sent to the front.[5] The
successful ground attack efforts led to a contract for another 100 D.H.5s.
Ground support was
also called upon during the Battle of the Minin Ridge road in September of
1917. Fighter Squadrons were ordered to patrol for eight hours, with pairs of
fighters being relieved every two hours. Pilots were ordered to fly at under
500 feet and to watch for any signs of developing German counter-attacks. Enemy
assembly points were also to be noted, and attacks were to be made against
troop concentrations, transports and gun positions as well as any low flying
enemy aircraft.[6]
Communication was
obviously a problem, since the ground attack aircraft could only be guided by
flares, smoke signals, panels, or signs, while the aircraft would be limited to
throwing down written messages to the ground troops.
By the fall of
1917, both Germans and Allies had aircraft and units dedicated to ground
attack. Casualties were high, and they remained high, especially when engaged
in strafing trenches. Occasionally during the fall of that year, long-range
patrols or sweeps were conducted by composite formations of Bristol F2B
Fighters, Sopwith Pups and D.H.5s. These sweeps were stepped in layers to
optimize the performance of each type of aircraft. Sopwith Pups would be flying
at 15,000 feet, the Bristol F2Bs at 12,000 feet, while the D.H.5s would be
flying at an altitude of 9,000 feet.[7]
The success rate of these formations has unfortunately not been able to gauge,
but they seem to have been discontinued during the last year of the war as more
high-performance types of aircraft came into widespread service.
On the eve of the
Battle of Cambrai, November 20, 1917, the RFC had amassed 134 single-seat
fighters and 18 two-seater Bristol Fighters against 20 fighters of Jasta 5. On the morning of November 20, all
three flights of Nos. 64 and 68 (Australian) Squadron, respectively, were in
the air, although rain and fog forced the flights to operate in pairs, and soon
enough aircraft were operating individually. The first casualty of No. 68
Squadron was probably Captain John Bell, who was shot through the chest. He
crashed and was rescued, but he died of his wounds. Next to follow was Lieutenant
Robertson, who’s D.H.5 was shot up so badly by an enemy aircraft that he had to
land at the advanced landing ground at Bapaume. Lieutenant Huxley of No. 68
Squadron reported that he had dropped one bomb at a gun carriage, machine
gunned the men around it, and killed three horses. He then blocked the road
into Cambri by smashing a supply wagon in a similar manner. Flying through the mist
he saw a body of 300 men, drawn up in fours as if on parade. “This parade was
dismissed quicker than [any] parade ever before.” Lieutenant Les H. Holden
landed his D.H.5 at the advanced landing ground with his machine a total wreck,
earning the nicknames “Lucky Les” and “Homing Pigeon”. Lieutenant Leslie N.
Ward was shot down by ground fire, and he broke his leg in the ensuing forced
landing behind German lines, where he was captured. Captain Gordon C. Wilson of
‘B’-flight, No. 68 Squadron described how Lieutenant Harry Taylor was downed: “Then,
as I zoomed up after a burst of machine-gun fire and turned to dive again, I
missed Taylor… The next second the red light of a pilot-rocket showed up beside
me. I guessed it was fired by Taylor, and it meant that he was in distress.
Another red light followed rapidly, and then I saw him down on the ground
wrecked and among the enemy. His machine was just a heap of wreckage. One wing
lay twenty yards away from the rest of the heap, from which Taylor had
scrambled…” Under protective fire from Captain Wilson, Taylor took up a German
rifle, joining with an advancing British infantry patrol which had lost its
officer, and leading it to bring in a wounded man. Taylor and his men made it
back to the own lines, but not before trying to fly off in Captain Bell’s
D.H.5. It was beyond repair, and Taylor rejoined the squadron at the advanced
landing ground. No. 68 Squadron had six D.H.5s shot down on November 20, and one
aircraft missing. One pilot was dead from his wounds, one survived his wounds,
and one was missing.[8] The
squadron was awarded six Military Crosses for its efforts during the Battle of
Cambrai.
Four D.H.5s of No.
64 Squadron were sent to Flesquières on November 20, and they began their
attacks on gun positions at 7am. “The pilots bombed the gun-pits, with their
25lb bombs, scoring at least one direct hit, and expended their ammunition
against the gun-detachments. One group of gunners, who ran for shelter to a
house, got jammed in the doorway and, immovable, were riddled by the bullets of
the leader of the D.H.5s. One of the pilots had a stoppage in his machine-gun
and had flown some distance eastwards before he had rectifies the stoppage. He
turned back towards Flesquières, but when he came over the German battery
positions again at 7-45 a.m, he could find no activity of guns or personnel. Several
corpses of men were lying near the pits, and dead horses and a limber were on
the road. It is possible that in the interim the guns had been pulled out and
the earlier low-flying attacks had caused or accelerated this precaution.”[9]
The attacks were a
complete success, and the gun positions were evacuated. Other gun positions
were strafed by Sopwith Camels from No. 3 and 46 Squadrons. The D.H.5s and
Camels continued engaging enemy positions throughout the day, only landing to
rearm and refuel their aircraft.
By dawn on
November 22, the battle was proceeding well, although the gains of the previous
days were commanded by enemy positions on and around a ridge by the Bourlon
Woods. Machine guns and infantry positions held up the advance, and the ridge
had to be taken. Starting at 7.10am, aircraft from four squadrons, Nos. 3, 46,
64 and 68 (Australian), attacked targets in the woods with bombs and machine
gun fire to soften up the German ground units. This time enemy aircraft
reinforced the defenses, but the main source of casualties remained
anti-aircraft fire. The actual infantry attack against the village
Fontaine-Nôtre Dame and the Bourlon Woods began on November 23, and it was supported
by the same four squadrons that had been active the day before. That morning,
the D.H.5s of No. 68 (Australian) Squadron found the British attack being held
up in a corner of Bourlon Woods. Three British tanks were brought to a halt by
a German battery consisting of two guns. Lieutenant F. G. Huxley attacked the
gun position with four 25-pound Cooper bombs from an altitude of 100 feet,
which temporarily suppressed the battery, allowing the three tanks as well as
another three behind to continue their attack. Huxley then proceeded to support
an infantry attack on another German strongpoint with machine gun fire, which
helped the infantry take the position. An American pilot serving with No. 68
(Australian) Squadron, Lieutenant A. Griggs, dived repeatedly at another
position in the area, but he was shot down and killed by ground fire.
After D.H.5s and
Camels had supported the attack on Bourlon Woods, it was concluded that “the
aeroplane pilots often made advance possible when the attacking troops would
otherwise have been pinned to the ground.”
By November 23,
Manfred von Richthofen’s Jagdgeschwader 1
had been sent to reinforce the German defenses. Von Richthofen forced a D.H.5 to
land before attacking D.H.5 A9299 flown by Lieutenant James Alexander Vazeill
Boddy of No. 64 Squadron at 2pm. Boddy described the action on November 23
after the war:
“The first target
I selected was a trench packed with Germans and as I dived down I was treated
to the thrilling spectacle of our men actually charging in and taking it at the
point of the bayonet. Next, I sprayed some reserves coming up from a village in
the rear and then turned my attention to the support trenches behind Bourlon
Wood which were to fully occupied to miss. Above the gaunt shattered trees of
the wood itself the scene was indescribable. Out of the fog of smoke and gas,
artillery and contact machines loomed from every direction. From below there
was an inferno of bursting shells and at the edge of the woods a row of tanks
appeared to be help up by anti-tank gun fire. One was blazing furiously. In the
hope of being able to help them I searched the wood for these batteries and did
my best to silence them with bombs and machine gun fire. My gun then jammed
badly, and I flew around trying to clear it. What happened after that I am
unable to say, but it seems that I was shot down and didn’t regain
consciousness until I reached a base hospital two or three days later. I do
remember seeing some of the red machines of Richthofen’s circus a few thousand
feet up, but there were some S.E.s up there too, so I left it at that.
Evidently one of them, and from the published list of his victories, I believe
it was the Baron himself, got through and on to my tail. A bullet fractured my
skull but subconsciously I must have kept control and tried to land – usually
the D.H.5 being nose heavy dropped like a brick if you let go of the stick. I
crashed between two trees in the north-east corner of the wood, and broke both
of my thighs, one being completely crushed by the engine.”[10]
When the Germans
counter-attacked on November 30, they also committed ground attack aircraft,
and there were several cases of brief air combat between the ground attack
missions. That same day, November 30, the heavy anti-aircraft fire around the
village of Bourlon led Lieutenant Arthur Gould Lee of No. 46 Squadron to try
out a new tactic. Lee and his wingman were ordered to attack a specific house
in the village in his Sopwith Camel using four 25-pound Cooper bombs. The
original plan called for four separate attacks dropping one bomb each time, but
the anti-aircraft fire dissuaded Lee, who instead opted for a steep dive into
the concentration of enemy fire to a release altitude of 200 feet.
Unfortunately, the two bombs dropped by Lee and his wingman missed the target,
and Lee decided to go back by himself. This time Lee dove down to 100 feet, and
he released his remaining three Cooper bombs, making his escape at a harrowing
altitude of 20 feet. However, his Camel was only hit by two enemy rounds, one
shattering the handle of his throttle control, and one grazing his Verey gun
shells.[11]
It is not known if the D.H.5 squadrons tried out bombing at a steep angle,
although the robustness of the D.H.5 would have allowed it, but the RFC and RAF
conducted various experiments with so-called dive-bombing from single-seaters
during 1918.
The air activity
continued to be intense around Cambrai until the offensive ended on December 7.
The Germans committed special squadrons, Schutzstaffeln,
for the protection of observation aircraft and for trench attack. There were
often more than 50 aircraft over a front of five miles, as described by a
pilot: “An absolute melee of aircraft around Bourlon Wood, the air thick with
D.H.5s, S.E.5s, R.E.8s and Bristol Fighters.”[12]
This was also the last hurrah for the D.H.5. since most units switched to
S.E.5s towards the end of 1917.
During the Battle
of Cambrai, the casualty rate never dropped below 30 percent, and during the
initial phases of the battle, on November 20, a staggering 35 percent of
aircraft committed to close air support failed to return. Out of the D.H.5s of
No. 64 Squadron, No. 68 (Australian) Squadron and the Sopwith Camels of No. 46
Squadron engaged that day, nine aircraft were lost over enemy territory, while
four were wrecked and thirteen were so badly damaged from enemy fire or accidents
in the prevailing mist that they had to be sent back to depots for
reconstruction. The fighter pilots resented close air support missions, as it
was seen as a terrible waste of men and equipment. One aviator claimed that he
would “rather than face a single trench-strafing foray, I would much prefer to
go through half a dozen dogfights with Albatroses”.[13]
It is worth noting
that the combined arms tactics of the Cambrai offensive led to German
anti-aircraft guns being used against tanks, and the German High Command had to
issue special orders to limit the use of anti-aircraft artillery against tanks.[14]
Ground attack aircraft still did retain some air defense tasks, though, and
four D.H.5s or Camels awaiting ground support missions were always to be
prepared to engage enemy aircraft before being called upon to support the
ground troops.
After the war, the
RAF did engage in ground attack missions as part of its air policing of the
colonies, but ground attack was not to be part of RAF doctrine, mainly due to
the high casualty rate. The heavy bomber was to be the main vehicle a new
strategic concept for engaging targets on the ground.
Bibliograhy:
John Bennett. Highest
Traditions. The History of No 2 Squadron RAAF. Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1995
F.M. Cutlack. Official History of the Australia in the War
of 1918, Vol. VIII, Australian Flying Corps < https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1417020>
Richard P. Hallion. Strike From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945. University of Alabama Press, 1989
H.
A. Jones. History of the Great War Based
on Official Documents of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
The War in the Air Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the
Royal Air Force, Vol IV. London: Oxford University Press, 1934
Colin
Owers. De Havilland Aircraft of World War
I. Volume 2: D.H.5 – D.H.15. Boulder: Flying Machines Press, 2001
Alex
Revell. British Fighter Units. Western
Front 1917-18. London: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1978
Charles
Schaedel. Men &Machines of the
Australian Flying Corps, 1914-19. Victoria: Kookaburra Technical
Publications,972
Peter C. Smith. Dive Bomber! Aircraft, Technology, and
Tactics in World War II. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008
The De Havilland
D.H.5. Profile Publications, Number 181. Leatherhead: Profile Publications.
[1] The De Havilland D.H.5. Profile Publications, Number
181. Leatherhead: Profile Publications, p. 5
[2] Owers, p.1
[3] P. 176
[4] Revell, pp. 17-18
[5] Jones, p. 180; Revell, p. 18
[6] Revell, p. 18
[7] Jones, p. 232
[8] Owers, pp. 2-3, Schaeder pp. 37-38
[9] F.M. Cutlack. Official
History of the Australia in the War of 1918, Vol. VIII, Australian Flying
Corps.
[10] Revell, pp. 22-24.
[11] Smith, p. 11
[12] Revell, p. 25
[13] Strike From the Sky, p 21.
[14] Jones, p. 246
