Monday, May 11, 2020

The beginning of Bomber Command's Strategic Air Offensive against Germany

250-lb GP bombs on trolleys are prepared by armourers, prior to loading into Handley Page Hampden Mark I, P1333 'EA-F', of No. 49 Squadron RAF at Scampton, Lincolnshire. P1333 crash-landed near Breda, Netherlands, on returning from a raid on Merseburg, Germany on 17 August 1940. The Hampden parked in the distance, P1347 'EA-D', crashed in Brittany with the loss of all her crew after being hit by anti-aircraft fire over Stettin, Germany, on 4/5 September 1940 (IWM/Air Ministry Second World War Official Collection).

On May 15, 1940, 36 Hampdens, 39 Wellingtons and 24 Whitleys from RAF Bomber Command took off on the very first mission to bomb German factories. The initial results were meagre, but at the end of the war, the British bomber offensive would have caused massive devastation – at a terrible cost.

Planning of an air campaign
The first significant change to the pre-war air bombing policy had been initiated by with a directive issued to C-in-C Bomber Command, Charles Portal, on April 13, 1940. This directive was more of a reaction to the course of the war than an actual bombing strategy, and it would affect the bombing campaign for the next few years. Plan WA 8 was the night attack on Germany, and the priorities were given as:


1.     Identifiable oil plants

2.     Identifiable electricity plants, coking plants and gas ovens

3.     Self-illuminating objectives vulnerable to air attack

4.     If authorized, main German ports in the Baltic


If the Low Countries were attacked, focus would be on “…vital objectives in Germany, starting in the Ruhr, to cause the maximum dislocation to lines of communication of the German advance through the Low Countries”. The importance of ‘identifiable’ targets was stressed at a War Cabinet meeting on May 10, and it was stated that “it is preferable not to begin bombing ops in the Ruhr until we have definite news that the Germans have attacked targets… which would cause casualties to civilians”.  

Rotterdam
Up to the end of the so-called Phoney War of 1939-1940, air activity on both sides had in general been limited to reconnaissance and leaflet dropping. However, there were bomber attacks on German and British soil before the opening of the Bomber Offensive against Germany. During a Luftwaffe attack on Scapa Flow on March 16, 1940, some of the raiders’ bombs fell on the small settlement of Bridge of Waithe on the island of Hoy. One civilian was killed and seven were injured. This prompted a retaliatory raid against a German seaplane base at Hörnum on the southern tip of the island of Sylt. Twenty Hampdens from 5 Group and thirty Whitleys from 4 Group. Only superficial damage was caused, but the raid was lauded in the press and the commander of No. 10 Squadron, Bill ‘Crack Em’ Staton, became a national hero.

On May 10, Germany invaded France and the Low Countries. Bomber Command flew tactical support missions with Fairey Battles and Bristol Blenheims against the advancing German columns, suffering heavy casualties in the process. The heavy bombers of Bomber Command undertook missions against German lines of communication, crossings over the river Meuse, and points of congestion behind enemy lines. The heavy squadrons conducted twenty-seven raids between May 11 and May 15. This was considered ‘collaboration’ in the land battle, and the targets were marshalling yards and communications lines west of the Rhine. It was thought that the Germans would see this as fully legitimate and non-provoking.

On May 13, the Luftwaffe launched a heavy attack on Rotterdam as a result of the tenacious Dutch defense of the city. One hundred Heinkel He 111 bombers took off to bomb Rotterdam, and almost a hundred tons of bombs were dropped on the city, killing close to a thousand civilians and destroying around 20,000 buildings. Rotterdam and the Netherlands capitulated that same day. This was the first air attack on a civilian target in the Western theatre of operations
The War Cabinet was of the opinion that the “gloves were off” regarding the air campaign and that the town of the Ruhr valley now were legitimate targets. On May 15, Prime Minister Chamberlain authorized bombing east of the Rhine for the night of May 15/16. 

Defenses
In June 1938, State Secretary of of Aviation, General Erhard Milch, ordered the creation of an Air Defense Zone (ADZ) West, which was to be a secondary line of Flak guns, searchlights and sound detectors integrated into the West Wall defenses. The idea was not to hinder attackers, but to make enemy formations disperse and seek higher altitudes, thus exposing them to fighter attack. The ADZ was between 20 and 50 kilometers wide, and a bomber would need up towards five minutes to cross the zone. Considering that the RAF envisioned daylight raids at an altitude of 10,000 feet during the 1930s, the ADZ would probably been quite effective. As the war broke out, the total Flak and searchlight forces available included 657 heavy Flak batteries, 560 light Flak batteries, and 188 searchlight batteries. There were also three railroad Flak gun battalions, three barrage balloon battalions and seven naval Flak gun battalions defending especially important parts of the German coast. Finally, the Luftwaffe also had two squadrons (Staffel) of Bf 109 aircraft in a night fighter role, 10./(N)JG 26 at Bonn-Hangelar to cover the Cologne area, and 10./(N)JG 53 at Heilbronn further south, near Stuttgart. The single-seat Bf 109 was however ill-suited to night-fighting at that time. A division (Gruppe), IV./(N) JG 2 of Bf 109s was added during the winter of 1939/40, to defend the Heligoland Bight, but successes were slow in the coming. In April of 1940, Hauptmann Wolfgang Falck, the commander of I./ZG 1 in occupied Denmark, began experimenting with night-fighting with his twin-engine Bf 110 heavy fighters based on an early form of radar intercept. Although Falck would be instrumental in the creation of an effective German night-fighter force, no German night fighters were engaged against the Bomber Command raid of May 15/16, and Hermann Göring did not accelerate the establishment of a night fighter force until the summer of 1940. 

The German defenses were also aided by radar installations, and the German had eight Freya installations on operation along the North Sea coast in addition to observers and sound ranging sites. The Freya radar could detect targets up to 120 kilometers away, but it could not determine the height of a target.

The Raid
At this early stage of the war, the bombing procedures were little changed from the RAF Independent Force of the Great War. Commanders were allowed considerable freedom within the scope of a mission. There was no attempt to fly in formation, and crews detailed for a night raid could take off at a time of their choosing within a period of two to three hours. They would fly to the target and back on their own, and the staggered departures were intentional and intended to prolong the air raid alarms over Germany, thus depriving the German worker of sleep. Briefings were given as much as twenty-four hours in advance, leaving it to the crews to plot the exact route and occasionally even to have a say in the bomb load. Navigations was done by dead reckoning, as direction finding by radio waves over the European continent was yet to be developed. The actual method of attack was often a matter of individual initiative. Aiming and navigation was aided by moonlight, and May 15 saw a waxing gibbous moon.

The bombers were sent against sixteen different targets throughout the Ruhr Valley. Factories in Dortmund, Sterkrade, and Castrop-Rauxel were designated as targets for nine aircraft each, while the remaining thirteen targets had fewer aircraft attacking. The raid was unspectacular in its execution. Eighty-one aircraft reported bombing at their primary targets or at alternative targets over a wide area with little or no effect. The defenses were alerted, but without any noticeable effect on the attackers.

A few bombs were recorded falling on Cologne and Munster. More specifically, a report from Cologne claimed that bombs aimed at the IG-Werk at Dormagen hit a large farm and killed a dairyman, Franz Romeike, who reportedly was on his way to the outhouse when he turned on a light that promptly attracted a stick of bombs. Another five civilians were wounded, but Romeike was the first of some 20,000 people of Cologne to be killed during the war. In Münster, local media reported that six bombs were dropped in the town, causing light damage and wounding two people. Münster was not on the target list, and no bomber crew reported attacking Münster, but the same local media claimed that “this bombing created a sensation and, for days on end, thousands of inquisitive people were attracted to the scene.” 

With the addition of operations conducted against targets in Belgium, 111 sorties were conducted that night. This was the first time Bomber Command exceeded 100 aircraft on night missions. The only loss was Wellington P9229 from No. 115 Squadron that was reportedly blown off course by a heavy wind and subsequently crashed into high ground at Plainville near Rouen in France. Flight Lieutenant A. E. Pringle and his crew of four – Corporal R. F. Fallows, Sergeant T. R. Kirkham, Corporal R. C. J. Pringle and Flying Officer H. P. Evans - were all killed, making these men the first casualties of the RAF strategic bombing Campaign.

The difficulties of bombing during the beginning of the war can be illustrated by an RAF pilot on a mission to bomb a railway target in Düsseldorf. He explained that when the crew reached the target area, German blackout procedures prevented them from identifying the railway station, whereupon they began to conduct a “square search” of the area. After a while, they simply dropped their bombs into the darkness below. This pilot then went on to complain that “such objectives were pointless when so many (crews) found difficulty in even locating the cities in which they were situated.” These comments do reveal certain things besides the difficulties of navigation, namely that the German defenses were not of such magnitude that a bomber could loiter over a major city in search of a target, and that the German blackout worked well.

Aftermath
Next morning, the announcement that a large force from Bomber Command had attacked various oil and communications targets in the Ruhr Valley was overwhelmingly welcomed by the British citizenry. There was finally a bright spot after weeks of bad news, and the war was carried home to the Boche. The communiqué from the Air Ministry was encouraging: “Each crew was given specific military objectives and instructions that bombs were not to be dropped indiscriminately. A few aircraft failed to locate their objectives and did not drop their bombs, but the majority found and bombed their targets with great effect causing widespread damage and many explosions.” In reality, the fifty-three German bombers that actually bombed Rotterdam caused massive damage. The ninety-nine RAF bombers did not. The raid was largely ineffective, and no real damage was recorded at the targets. Of the 78 aircraft given oil installations as their primary target, only 23 claimed to have found them. For various reasons 16 aircraft failed to attack any target at all.

 Bomber Command revisited the Ruhr next day, this time with a mere twelve aircraft on a mission against oil targets. Throughout May approximately 60 bombers per night were dispatched against industrial targets or targets connected to the Battle of France, such as lines of communication or troop concentrations. Charles Portal believed that Bomber Command would be able to do ‘immense damage’ to German oil production, and on June 4 1940 it was estimated that the German oil production would be reduced by approximately half a million tons in two or three months’ time. In reality, it took three and a half years to reduce the German oil production by 150,000 tons. The strategic bombing campaign also cost the lives of more than 350,000 Germans and tens of thousands of civilians in the surrounding countries. Bomber Command lost 55,573 men in that very same Campaign.

Sources: 

Mark Connelly. Reaching for the Stars. A New History of Bomber Command in World War II. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001

Robin Cross. The Bombers. The Illustrated Story of Ofensive Strategy and Tactics in the Twentieth Century. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1987

Ken Delve and Peter Jacobs. The Six-Year Offensive. Bomber Command in World War Two. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992
Jonathan Falkner, RAF Bomber Crewman. West Bay: Shire Publications, 2010

Max Hastings. Bomber Command. Churchills Epic Campaign. The Inside Story of the RAF’s Valiant Attempt to End the War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989 

Peter Hinchliffe. The Other Battle. Luftwaffe Aces versus Bomber Command. Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1997

Robert Jackson. Before the Storm. The Story of Bomber Command 1939-42. London: Cassell, 2001

Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt. The Bomber Command War Diaries. An Operational Reference Book 1939-1945. Hirsham: Midland Publishing, 2011

Denis Richards. The Hardest Victory. RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995

Edward B. Westermann. Flak. German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001

Wednesday, December 25, 2019

1713: the French attack on Curacao

Curacao, for those readers who aren’t familiar with the island, is part of the Dutch Antillies, and it is located some 70 kilometers north of Venezuela between Aruba and Bonaire. The Spanish arrived in 1499, and most of the native Arawak population had been deported by 1515. The Dutch captured the island in 1634 and subsequently fortified the island. Curacao was declared a free port in 1674, and the Dutch West Indies Company (DWIC) turned Curacao into an important hub for the slave trade as well as other forms of trade.

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) involved, amongst many others, the Kingdom of France and Bourbon Spain fighting against the Netherlands, the Holy Roman Empire, Great Britain, and other allies. The year of 1713 saw Curacao under attack by the French, and more specifically a fleet commanded by the French freebooter Jacques Cassard (1679-1740), what seems to have been a fairly colorful character in the Golden age of piracy. Cassard came from a family of merchants in Nantes, and he began his career as a sailor at the age of 14. After some time in the French Navy, he became the captain of a merchantman, but he decide to embark on a career as a privateer when the War of the Spanish Succession broke out in 1701. He was quite successful and he was given an officer’s rank in the French navy in 1707, where his successes continued.

Cassard took command of a squadron of men-of-war consisting of nine vessels that had been fitted out privately in St. Malo and Nates in December 1711. He sailed off into the Atlantic, taking St. Iago on the Cape Verde Island before pillaging Montserrat and Antigua and ransoming Surinam. By January 1713, Cassard had been reinforced by six freebooter vessels commanded by a Collart as well as another three vessels from Guadalope. The squadron attacked St. Eustasius on January 25. The Dutch inhabitants scattered into the jungle, and Cassard obtained a small ransom before setting sail southwest towards Curacao.
 Cassard’s squadron reached Curacao on February 1713, and he paraded the squadron before Fort Amsterdam. He discovered that the defenders had been aware of his impending arrival thanks to information from the governor of St. Thomas, and there were also already lots of rumors of possible peace negotiations between the Netherlands and France.
The situation was further complicated for Cassard when the flagship of the squadron, the Neptune, ran into a reef. The ship was lost together with much of the siege train, namely 17 field pieces and 1,000 mortar shells. Meanwhile, the Rubis is carried away further west by wind and currents. The situations seems to have been a bit of a mess, since Cassard doesn’t land his troops until a full twelve days later, when 560 soldiers, 320 buccaneers and 180 sailors disembark at Santa Cruz Bay on western Curacao.
The Dutch defenders number 800 men under Governor Jeremias van Collen (1675?-1715). The DWIC had appointed him as governor of Curacao on December 11, 1711, but he had worked for the DWIC for many years (as had his brother Ferdinand, the future mayor of Amsterdam, back in the Netherlands). The Dutch ranks contained noblemen, plantation workers, merchants, tradesmen, Jews, including Captain Mordechay Henriquez, Lieutenant Aaron Levi Maduro, and Standard bearer Samuel Gomez, and even a couple of slaves, but few regulars, so they were limited to delaying actions against the French. However, the Dutch were ready for the landings, and the French suffered some 50 casualties, including Cassard himself, who was wounded in the foot. He ceded command to the commanding officer of the Téméraire, Captain Anne Henry de Bandeville de Saint Périer. The French pressed forward, and on February 22 a pitched battle was fought against a Dutch company entrenched on a hill featuring the strategically located Malpais plantation approximately eight kilometers northwest of Willemstad. The French Captain Rutty commanded the center, and he was supported by Collart on the left and probably a d’Espinay on the right. Captain Rutty attacked the center supported by Collart, and d’Espinay was eventually able to outflank the Dutch, forcing the defenders to retreat into Willemstad. Bandeville took Otrobanda, immediately to the west of Willemstad, and deployed three small mortars, but they did not pose a threat to Willemstad, which was also protected by three Dutch vessels anchored in the harbor. The French did wreak havoc on the unguarded plantations of Curacao, and several slaves joined the French. After few days of rampage, Bandeville sent an emissary under a flag of truce, probably on February 27, to propose terms. Governor van Collen negotiated for several more days, and a truce was decided upon on March 3. The French were to leave Curacao without further pillaging in exchange for a ransom of 115 000 Spanish pesos. The war ended with the Treaty of Utrecht on April 11, 1713, but Cassard returned to France with a loot worth between nine and ten million francs. Cassard's exploits won him the Order of Saint Louis.

After the end of the war in 1713, Cassard started numerous trials to obtain payments. He retired in 1731, but jealousy from fellow aristocrats and his own impudence made his life quite difficult. Jacques Cassard was declared insane in 1736 after insulting the Cardinal de Fleury, and detained in Ham, where he died four years later. 


Jacques Cassard by Pierren - Photographed in Histoire de la Marine française illustrée, Larousse, 1934., Public Domain <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=7544765>.

Sources
Mordechai Arbell. The Jewish Nation of the Caribbean. The Spanish-Portuguese Jewish Settlements in the Caribbean and the Guianas. Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing, 2002
Irmela Herzog and Vincent Mom 2019. Reconstructing the Military Infrastructure of Curaçao in the Late 18th Century. <https://www.chnt.at/wp-content/uploads/eBook_CHNT22_Herzog_Mom.pdf>

David F. Marley. Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to the Present. Santa Barbera, ABC CIIO, 1998

Alphonse Rutten. Jacques Cassard et la pharmacie militaire à l'île de Curaçao en 1713. Revue d'Histoire de la Pharmacie Année 1996 310

E. P. Statham. Privateers and Privateering. Forgotten Books, 2017.






Wednesday, April 3, 2019

The Sheerophone

During the First World War, there were quite a few attempts to use acoustics to at least estimate the bearing of enemy air activity. The defense systems of Great Britain sported the acoustic mirrors, while other nations labored with various trumpet-like devices to resolve the bearing of incoming enemy aircraft. In 1916, the Italians tried using a contraption that probably later was referred to as the "sheerophone", which is pictured below. The photograph seems to be quite unique, so it may reasonable to assume that the sheereophone did not come into widespread use, The RFC (Royal Flying Corps) may have used a similar device on its aerodromes close to the front, but this has not been confirmed.


Wednesday, January 16, 2019

The Airco D.H.5 and ground attack in 1917


Bombing and ground attack has been an aspect of military aviation ever since 1911, when Italian Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti dropped four grenades over Libya for the first time. Towards the second half of 1917, ground attack was becoming increasingly common on both sides fighting in the First World War. The slightly awkward looking Airco D.H.5 became one of the first dedicated air support aircraft, even if it was designed to for a different role.
The D.H.5 was designed by Geoffrey de Havilland , and the prototype flew in late 1916. After some modifications, the test pilot found the aircraft to be stable, easy to fly and “handy and quick in the air.” The aircraft was also found to be very sturdy, with the wings being able to withstand very high loads in testing. Oliver Stewart wrote that “This aeroplane could dive. That might be written in the memory of the D.H.5… the sight of a formation of D.H.5s was one of the most impressive things of the air war. They appeared to stand vertically on their noses and fall out of the sky like a flight of bombs.”[1] It did turn out that the merits of the D.H.5 did include great maneuverability at altitudes below 10,000 feet, excellent forward field of view and a remarkably sturdy construction. An example of the sturdiness could be noted on November 16, 1917, when 2nd Lieutenant W.R. Jones of No. 32 Squadron had an anti-aircraft shell pass completely through the fuselage of his D.H.5. Only minor damage was sustained, and Jones could land safely.[2]
By building the stagger-wing D.H.5, de Havilland was hoping to combine the excellent view of the pusher aircraft with the aerodynamic and offensive benefits of a tractor aircraft with a synchronized machine gun. Unfortunately, this also meant that the aircraft had little or no view backwards, obviously a significant disadvantage in a dogfight. Oddly enough, the initial machine gun mounting enabled the Vickers machine gun to be elevated in an upwards arc to 60 degrees, thereby enabling the D.H.5 to attack aircraft from below. The D,H.5 was unpopular throughout its service, and several rumors, mostly unfounded, circulated about the handling qualities of the D.H.5. It was a fact that the aircraft did have a serious drop in performance at altitudes above 10,000 feet, and it lost altitude quickly in air-to-air combat. Being known as “De Havilland’s fifth effort”, it was also said that the design was put into service against the wishes of the designer.
The first production D.H.5s reached No. 24 Squadron on May 1, 1917, and for some time this squadron used both D.H.5s and D.H.2s. Eventually the D.H.5 equipped NO. 68 Squadron RFC/No. 2 Squadron AFC, No. 6 and 7 (Training) Squadrons, AFC, and Nos. 24, 32, 41, 64, and 65 Squadrons RFC. The D.H.5 flew various sorties throughout the summer of 1917, but the Ypres battle that started on July 31 was to be the first concerted use of the D.H.5 as a ground attack aircraft.
During the battles for Ypres, the orders for deployment on August 16, 1917 of the II. and V. brigades RFC called for “machine gun and bombing attacks (by night and day) on German aerodromes” as well as machine gun attacks on troops and transport as well as a series of offensive patrols. The V. brigade had squadrons equipped with D.H.5s, and it was decided to coordinate the squadrons with the infantry advance by allocating two D.H.5s to each division for cooperation with the forward infantry in their attack on the final objective.[3] The pilots “were to patrol at low altitude just short of the barrage and engage enemy defensive positions that held up the British advance.” This obviously precluded concentrated air support efforts, and although it may seem reasonable to parse out close air support to all participating infantry units, in reality this left the D.H.5s to provide limited support while making them even more vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire – a larger air unit would be able to overwhelm anti-air defenses, as proven during WW2. It should be added that inclement weather at low altitude also made it quite hazardous to use larger formations.
Besides the divisional support, two patrols, each consisting of four unspecified single seaters, were to cover the entire front of the 5th Army at low altitude, typically 200 to 600 feet, on the enemy side of the front to engage any counterattack. This undertaking seems extraordinarily hazardous, and a concerted enemy effort with several well-placed machine guns would probably have been quite able to dissuade the four single seaters. Besides engaging counterattacks, the four aircraft were also to prevent German contact patrols as a secondary task, although flying at low altitude might very well have made the aircraft the prey of any German contact patrols.
Enemy airfields were also to be engaged, but in a piecemeal fashion, starting with a machine gun fire from a single aircraft as soon as light permitted for accurate firing. The German airfields were thereafter supposed to be bombed over the course of the day. The notion of massing an attack to disable as many enemy aircraft as possible does not seem to have been an option, but the practicalities of launching a squadron before dawn in inclement weather may very well have prohibited this.  
The D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron had successfully provided ground support to the 3rd Army on August 9, and on August 19, support was more concentrated. The advance of the 3rd Brigade was to be supported by five D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron, nine from No. 24 Squadron, and four F.E.2bs. Immediately prior to the infantry attack, three D.H.5s of No. 41 Squadron went “over the top” to attack German front line trenches. They were followed by F.E.2bs of No. 18 Squadron, which attacked German trenches as the infantry advanced. The attack was subsequently deemed successful and well-coordinated, and the attacking aircraft supported by S.E.5as of No. 60 Squadron fired some 9,000 rounds into enemy positions.[4] On August 26 the attacks were supported by twelve D.H.5s of Nos. 24 and 41 Squadrons while strong friendly patrols kept German aircraft away from the D.H.5s. However, the confused nature of the ground fighting made effective ground support from the D.H.5s difficult, although Nieuports of No. 29 Squadron provided interdiction by strafing German support lines and reinforcements that were being sent to the front.[5] The successful ground attack efforts led to a contract for another 100 D.H.5s.
Ground support was also called upon during the Battle of the Minin Ridge road in September of 1917. Fighter Squadrons were ordered to patrol for eight hours, with pairs of fighters being relieved every two hours. Pilots were ordered to fly at under 500 feet and to watch for any signs of developing German counter-attacks. Enemy assembly points were also to be noted, and attacks were to be made against troop concentrations, transports and gun positions as well as any low flying enemy aircraft.[6]
Communication was obviously a problem, since the ground attack aircraft could only be guided by flares, smoke signals, panels, or signs, while the aircraft would be limited to throwing down written messages to the ground troops.
By the fall of 1917, both Germans and Allies had aircraft and units dedicated to ground attack. Casualties were high, and they remained high, especially when engaged in strafing trenches. Occasionally during the fall of that year, long-range patrols or sweeps were conducted by composite formations of Bristol F2B Fighters, Sopwith Pups and D.H.5s. These sweeps were stepped in layers to optimize the performance of each type of aircraft. Sopwith Pups would be flying at 15,000 feet, the Bristol F2Bs at 12,000 feet, while the D.H.5s would be flying at an altitude of 9,000 feet.[7] The success rate of these formations has unfortunately not been able to gauge, but they seem to have been discontinued during the last year of the war as more high-performance types of aircraft came into widespread service.
On the eve of the Battle of Cambrai, November 20, 1917, the RFC had amassed 134 single-seat fighters and 18 two-seater Bristol Fighters against 20 fighters of Jasta 5. On the morning of November 20, all three flights of Nos. 64 and 68 (Australian) Squadron, respectively, were in the air, although rain and fog forced the flights to operate in pairs, and soon enough aircraft were operating individually. The first casualty of No. 68 Squadron was probably Captain John Bell, who was shot through the chest. He crashed and was rescued, but he died of his wounds. Next to follow was Lieutenant Robertson, who’s D.H.5 was shot up so badly by an enemy aircraft that he had to land at the advanced landing ground at Bapaume. Lieutenant Huxley of No. 68 Squadron reported that he had dropped one bomb at a gun carriage, machine gunned the men around it, and killed three horses. He then blocked the road into Cambri by smashing a supply wagon in a similar manner. Flying through the mist he saw a body of 300 men, drawn up in fours as if on parade. “This parade was dismissed quicker than [any] parade ever before.” Lieutenant Les H. Holden landed his D.H.5 at the advanced landing ground with his machine a total wreck, earning the nicknames “Lucky Les” and “Homing Pigeon”. Lieutenant Leslie N. Ward was shot down by ground fire, and he broke his leg in the ensuing forced landing behind German lines, where he was captured. Captain Gordon C. Wilson of ‘B’-flight, No. 68 Squadron described how Lieutenant Harry Taylor was downed: “Then, as I zoomed up after a burst of machine-gun fire and turned to dive again, I missed Taylor… The next second the red light of a pilot-rocket showed up beside me. I guessed it was fired by Taylor, and it meant that he was in distress. Another red light followed rapidly, and then I saw him down on the ground wrecked and among the enemy. His machine was just a heap of wreckage. One wing lay twenty yards away from the rest of the heap, from which Taylor had scrambled…” Under protective fire from Captain Wilson, Taylor took up a German rifle, joining with an advancing British infantry patrol which had lost its officer, and leading it to bring in a wounded man. Taylor and his men made it back to the own lines, but not before trying to fly off in Captain Bell’s D.H.5. It was beyond repair, and Taylor rejoined the squadron at the advanced landing ground. No. 68 Squadron had six D.H.5s shot down on November 20, and one aircraft missing. One pilot was dead from his wounds, one survived his wounds, and one was missing.[8] The squadron was awarded six Military Crosses for its efforts during the Battle of Cambrai.
Four D.H.5s of No. 64 Squadron were sent to Flesquières on November 20, and they began their attacks on gun positions at 7am. “The pilots bombed the gun-pits, with their 25lb bombs, scoring at least one direct hit, and expended their ammunition against the gun-detachments. One group of gunners, who ran for shelter to a house, got jammed in the doorway and, immovable, were riddled by the bullets of the leader of the D.H.5s. One of the pilots had a stoppage in his machine-gun and had flown some distance eastwards before he had rectifies the stoppage. He turned back towards Flesquières, but when he came over the German battery positions again at 7-45 a.m, he could find no activity of guns or personnel. Several corpses of men were lying near the pits, and dead horses and a limber were on the road. It is possible that in the interim the guns had been pulled out and the earlier low-flying attacks had caused or accelerated this precaution.”[9]  
The attacks were a complete success, and the gun positions were evacuated. Other gun positions were strafed by Sopwith Camels from No. 3 and 46 Squadrons. The D.H.5s and Camels continued engaging enemy positions throughout the day, only landing to rearm and refuel their aircraft.   
By dawn on November 22, the battle was proceeding well, although the gains of the previous days were commanded by enemy positions on and around a ridge by the Bourlon Woods. Machine guns and infantry positions held up the advance, and the ridge had to be taken. Starting at 7.10am, aircraft from four squadrons, Nos. 3, 46, 64 and 68 (Australian), attacked targets in the woods with bombs and machine gun fire to soften up the German ground units. This time enemy aircraft reinforced the defenses, but the main source of casualties remained anti-aircraft fire. The actual infantry attack against the village Fontaine-Nôtre Dame and the Bourlon Woods began on November 23, and it was supported by the same four squadrons that had been active the day before. That morning, the D.H.5s of No. 68 (Australian) Squadron found the British attack being held up in a corner of Bourlon Woods. Three British tanks were brought to a halt by a German battery consisting of two guns. Lieutenant F. G. Huxley attacked the gun position with four 25-pound Cooper bombs from an altitude of 100 feet, which temporarily suppressed the battery, allowing the three tanks as well as another three behind to continue their attack. Huxley then proceeded to support an infantry attack on another German strongpoint with machine gun fire, which helped the infantry take the position. An American pilot serving with No. 68 (Australian) Squadron, Lieutenant A. Griggs, dived repeatedly at another position in the area, but he was shot down and killed by ground fire.
After D.H.5s and Camels had supported the attack on Bourlon Woods, it was concluded that “the aeroplane pilots often made advance possible when the attacking troops would otherwise have been pinned to the ground.”
By November 23, Manfred von Richthofen’s Jagdgeschwader 1 had been sent to reinforce the German defenses. Von Richthofen forced a D.H.5 to land before attacking D.H.5 A9299 flown by Lieutenant James Alexander Vazeill Boddy of No. 64 Squadron at 2pm. Boddy described the action on November 23 after the war:
“The first target I selected was a trench packed with Germans and as I dived down I was treated to the thrilling spectacle of our men actually charging in and taking it at the point of the bayonet. Next, I sprayed some reserves coming up from a village in the rear and then turned my attention to the support trenches behind Bourlon Wood which were to fully occupied to miss. Above the gaunt shattered trees of the wood itself the scene was indescribable. Out of the fog of smoke and gas, artillery and contact machines loomed from every direction. From below there was an inferno of bursting shells and at the edge of the woods a row of tanks appeared to be help up by anti-tank gun fire. One was blazing furiously. In the hope of being able to help them I searched the wood for these batteries and did my best to silence them with bombs and machine gun fire. My gun then jammed badly, and I flew around trying to clear it. What happened after that I am unable to say, but it seems that I was shot down and didn’t regain consciousness until I reached a base hospital two or three days later. I do remember seeing some of the red machines of Richthofen’s circus a few thousand feet up, but there were some S.E.s up there too, so I left it at that. Evidently one of them, and from the published list of his victories, I believe it was the Baron himself, got through and on to my tail. A bullet fractured my skull but subconsciously I must have kept control and tried to land – usually the D.H.5 being nose heavy dropped like a brick if you let go of the stick. I crashed between two trees in the north-east corner of the wood, and broke both of my thighs, one being completely crushed by the engine.”[10] 
When the Germans counter-attacked on November 30, they also committed ground attack aircraft, and there were several cases of brief air combat between the ground attack missions. That same day, November 30, the heavy anti-aircraft fire around the village of Bourlon led Lieutenant Arthur Gould Lee of No. 46 Squadron to try out a new tactic. Lee and his wingman were ordered to attack a specific house in the village in his Sopwith Camel using four 25-pound Cooper bombs. The original plan called for four separate attacks dropping one bomb each time, but the anti-aircraft fire dissuaded Lee, who instead opted for a steep dive into the concentration of enemy fire to a release altitude of 200 feet. Unfortunately, the two bombs dropped by Lee and his wingman missed the target, and Lee decided to go back by himself. This time Lee dove down to 100 feet, and he released his remaining three Cooper bombs, making his escape at a harrowing altitude of 20 feet. However, his Camel was only hit by two enemy rounds, one shattering the handle of his throttle control, and one grazing his Verey gun shells.[11] It is not known if the D.H.5 squadrons tried out bombing at a steep angle, although the robustness of the D.H.5 would have allowed it, but the RFC and RAF conducted various experiments with so-called dive-bombing from single-seaters during 1918.
The air activity continued to be intense around Cambrai until the offensive ended on December 7. The Germans committed special squadrons, Schutzstaffeln, for the protection of observation aircraft and for trench attack. There were often more than 50 aircraft over a front of five miles, as described by a pilot: “An absolute melee of aircraft around Bourlon Wood, the air thick with D.H.5s, S.E.5s, R.E.8s and Bristol Fighters.”[12] This was also the last hurrah for the D.H.5. since most units switched to S.E.5s towards the end of 1917.
During the Battle of Cambrai, the casualty rate never dropped below 30 percent, and during the initial phases of the battle, on November 20, a staggering 35 percent of aircraft committed to close air support failed to return. Out of the D.H.5s of No. 64 Squadron, No. 68 (Australian) Squadron and the Sopwith Camels of No. 46 Squadron engaged that day, nine aircraft were lost over enemy territory, while four were wrecked and thirteen were so badly damaged from enemy fire or accidents in the prevailing mist that they had to be sent back to depots for reconstruction. The fighter pilots resented close air support missions, as it was seen as a terrible waste of men and equipment. One aviator claimed that he would “rather than face a single trench-strafing foray, I would much prefer to go through half a dozen dogfights with Albatroses”.[13]
It is worth noting that the combined arms tactics of the Cambrai offensive led to German anti-aircraft guns being used against tanks, and the German High Command had to issue special orders to limit the use of anti-aircraft artillery against tanks.[14] Ground attack aircraft still did retain some air defense tasks, though, and four D.H.5s or Camels awaiting ground support missions were always to be prepared to engage enemy aircraft before being called upon to support the ground troops.
After the war, the RAF did engage in ground attack missions as part of its air policing of the colonies, but ground attack was not to be part of RAF doctrine, mainly due to the high casualty rate. The heavy bomber was to be the main vehicle a new strategic concept for engaging targets on the ground.


Bibliograhy:
 John Bennett. Highest Traditions. The History of No 2 Squadron RAAF. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995
F.M. Cutlack. Official History of the Australia in the War of 1918, Vol. VIII, Australian Flying Corps < https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1417020>
Richard P. Hallion. Strike From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945.  University of Alabama Press, 1989
H. A. Jones. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The War in the Air Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, Vol IV. London: Oxford University Press, 1934
Colin Owers. De Havilland Aircraft of World War I. Volume 2: D.H.5 – D.H.15. Boulder: Flying Machines Press, 2001
Alex Revell. British Fighter Units. Western Front 1917-18. London: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1978
Charles Schaedel. Men &Machines of the Australian Flying Corps, 1914-19. Victoria: Kookaburra Technical Publications,972
Peter C. Smith. Dive Bomber! Aircraft, Technology, and Tactics in World War II. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008
The De Havilland D.H.5. Profile Publications, Number 181. Leatherhead: Profile Publications.


[1] The De Havilland D.H.5. Profile Publications, Number 181. Leatherhead: Profile Publications, p. 5
[2] Owers, p.1
[3] P. 176
[4] Revell, pp. 17-18
[5] Jones, p. 180; Revell, p. 18
[6] Revell, p. 18
[7] Jones, p. 232
[8] Owers, pp. 2-3, Schaeder pp. 37-38
[9] F.M. Cutlack. Official History of the Australia in the War of 1918, Vol. VIII, Australian Flying Corps.
[10] Revell, pp. 22-24.
[11] Smith, p. 11
[12] Revell, p. 25
[13] Strike From the Sky, p 21.
[14] Jones, p. 246